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Abstract
Natural disasters are increasingly costly for the United States. The literature suggests
emergency managers may improve disaster outcomes and enhance disaster resilience by
supplementing their official public-communications methods with more bi-directional
communication tactics using social media. This study aims to understand how social media is
used within the “whole community” of emergency management in areas affected by recent
hurricanes. The first research objective examines how social media is used by governmental and
non-governmental organizations across the four phases of emergency management
(preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation). The second objective is to identify challenges
governmental and non-governmental groups have encountered and strategies they recommend
addressing these problems. The third objective is to examine how social media was used by
disaster responders specifically during the response phase of Hurricane Harvey in 2017. We
conducted a survey of 269 organizations in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012
to address research objectives one and two, and for the third objective, surveyed 64 organizations
who contributed to the rescue and response efforts during Hurricane Harvey. The first survey
found respondents representing government-related organizations use social media more during
the response and the preparedness phases, while non-governmental groups report more social
media activity during the recovery phase. This finding suggests that organizations performing
primary and secondary roles in emergency management play complementary roles in risk and
crisis communication with the public. The results also suggest that the emergency management
community primarily uses social media to “push” information to the public through established
communication networks and could benefit from additional efforts to “pull” information from
their networks. Survey respondents report greatest concern about challenges external to their

x

organizations, with the accuracy of information found on social media to be most concerning.
The third research objective finds generally high levels of social media use among Hurricane
Harvey responders, but also evidence of technical challenges including an inability to convert
web-based communications to dispatchable missions due to limited functionality of their 911
systems. The results of the study provide insights regarding uses, challenges, and strategies to
improve social media for the whole community of emergency management.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Research Problem
As Atlantic hurricane seasons continue to produce more costly and damaging storms, and
Americans increasingly prefer web-based communications, emergency management (EM)
agencies and other disaster respondents must develop new strategies to reach preparedness and
emergency communication goals. One suggestion to improve disaster outcomes is to involve all
stakeholder groups, or the whole community to contribute to EM, throughout the four phases of
disaster; including preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (DHS 2012a, FEMA 2011).
Effective risk and crisis communication are key for the public to accurately perceive hazards and
take life-saving precautions. Emergency broadcast systems deliver official emergency
communication messages to populations at risk, but often may lack the ability to interact bidirectionally with the public and may fail to reach all citizens in a potentially hazardous area.
National level EM agencies agree incorporating two-way communication channels to
supplement official messages can lead to better disaster outcomes, and that selecting popular
social networks may help to extend the reach of risk and crisis communication (Fugate 2011b,
DHS 2014a). Social media (SM) platforms offer a wide range of tools already in use by most
Americans. However, the adoption of SM tools as unofficial communication channels
supplementing traditional risk and crisis communication methods and protocols require EMs to
formulate new strategies to overcome the challenges of maintaining two-way communication
channels. These challenges may arise from both the inherent challenges of human
communication and interaction, and from the continuously-evolving technologies where the
human interactions occur.
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As public preferences and the leadership of agencies and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) involved in EM continue to support the enhancement of risk and crisis communication
through adoption of SM tools, it is important to evaluate progress in the EM field concerning use
and realization of the potential benefits of SM. A systematic examination of how SM is used, for
what purposes, and what problems have been encountered could help to inform investment and
promotion strategies supporting national EM goals.
This study contributes original survey findings from two investigations: present
utilization of SM by key EM institutions in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in
2012, and the use of SM to assist rescue and response efforts during Hurricane Harvey in 2017.
The research was supported by two grants awarded by the National Science Foundation and
contributes to the work of ICAR1 at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge.
1.2. Research Objectives
An objective of emergency communication is to reach all citizens in a potentially
hazardous area with a message that conveys information about a threat coupled with advice
aimed to minimize loss of life and property. This study seeks to inform EM leadership at all
levels with an aim to increase the efficacy of emergency communications with SM. The research
objectives address the following three topics.
1.2.1. Research Objective I: Examining Social Media Adoption and Usage among EM
Organizations
The first research objective is to provide researchers, EMs, and supporting organizations
with new insights about risk and crisis communication conducted by key organizations through
SM in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012. These include four types of
organizations that represent the whole community of EM, including first responders, government-

1

Interdisciplinary Computation and Analysis of Resilience (https://twitter.com/icar_lsu)
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related agencies and offices, news media organizations, and non-governmental organizations.
We examine the extent to which they use SM during the four phases of emergency management,
including SM adoption rates, specific communication objectives, perceived benefits, preferred
communication channels or SM platforms, and barriers to use among those not using SM for risk
and crisis communication. The first objective addresses the specific research questions:
Research Question 1.1: What is the role of social media among public agencies and
NGO respondents?
Research Question 1.2: Which specific social media platforms or channels do survey
respondents prefer when communicating with the public?
These findings will provide insight into the adoption rates of SM in the EM community,
the roles of SM in their organizations, their attitudes and perceptions of its usefulness, and
barriers keeping some respondents from adopting SM tools. Knowing which types of
organizations report lower SM adoption rates should help EM leadership to focus effort to
encourage the whole community to participate in EM. Understanding the barriers keeping some
organizations from adopting SM tools will provide additional insights for managers within these
organizations. The research also will provide information to compare organizational adoption of
specific SM tools and platforms with public preference trends. The Pew Research Center2
suggests different population segments appear to prefer certain SM channels, meaning strategic
organizational SM channel selection may help EMs broaden the reach of their communications.
Knowing which types of organizations may have greater misalignment with public preferences
provides information that could be used to help narrow potential disparities or gaps in the reach
of risk and crisis communication to some members of the public.

Pew Research Center. 2018. “Social Media Fact Sheet.” Internet & Technology, 5 Feb 2018.
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media. Accessed March 5, 2018.
2
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1.2.2. Research Objective II: Examining Social Media Challenges and Strategies to
Improve its Utility in EM
The second research objective is to identify obstacles and challenges to the use of SM
among governmental and non-governmental organizations. We compare the challenges reported
by government-type respondents to those reported by non-government responses to examine the
potential effect of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) on the use of SM during
emergencies reported by government organizations. Given the guidelines provided to
government agencies through NIMS, we are interested in whether respondents from government
organizations report fewer difficulties in implementing social media in their work with the public
during emergencies.
We also are particularly interested in detecting new or emerging challenges that may not
have been identified in earlier examinations of SM use among groups working in the emergency
management field. In addition, the second research objective seeks to identify tactics and
strategies respondents may be employing to overcome these challenges. Specifically, we pose
the following questions:
Research Question 2.1: Which key obstacles are most commonly reported by survey
respondents concerning the use of social media in risk and crisis communication?
Research Question 2.2: To what extent are survey respondents attempting to evaluate
the effectiveness of their online communications?
Research Question 2.3: Which tactics and strategies do survey respondents report
employing to overcome the obstacles they encounter in their use of social media for
risk and crisis communication?
Awareness of emerging challenges is central to optimize investment and education
strategies supporting the use of SM in the EM field. Evidence of growing or lessening concern
about challenges reported in previous studies also may indicate the success of federal guidance
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such as the Social Media Working Group3 (SMWG) discussed in greater detail in the following
chapter.
1.2.3. Research Objective III: Social Media and Hurricane Harvey
While the first two research objectives offer insight into SM use in the EM field in areas
affected by hurricanes in 2012, the third is a case study of how SM was used to aid responders
during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Based on a separate survey of organizations involved in the
emergency response phase of this urban-scale flood disaster, we compare SM use among three
groups, including first responders, government-related agencies and offices, and non-government
organizations (including news media organizations).
The third research objective seeks to provide insight regarding the utilization of SM in
assisting response and rescue efforts, and to shed light on strategies applied to overcome
common obstacles of SM use during this recent disaster. Lastly, Hurricane Harvey responders
offer suggestions to improve the utility of SM in future disasters. We address the following
research questions:
Research Question 3.1: How did survey respondents utilize social media to assist
response and rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey?
Research Question 3.2: How did survey respondents address commonly reported
obstacles concerning the use of social media during disasters?
Research Question 3.3: Which recommendations do responders suggest could
improve the utility of social media in future emergencies?
Lessons learned from agencies and organizations involved in the response phase of an
urban-scale emergency can help to guide and inform technology developers as they work to
make features of SM more user-friendly. Also, the information should help EM leadership
provide targeted support and guidance to improve rescue and response efforts in future disasters.

3

https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/smwg.
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1.3. Study Areas and Events
The US Counties and respective States affected by 2012 Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy
defined through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster declarations form
the study area investigated by the first and second research objectives. Each region of the study
area also includes targeting a major metropolitan area to capture greater local-level participation
in survey responses. The Sandy study area includes 93 counties in eight US States, the District
of Columbia, and New York City. The Isaac study area includes 123 counties in four US States
and the City of New Orleans. New York City and New Orleans serve as county-level geographic
units due to their regional influence and high density of municipal-level public agencies and
organizations. The Hurricane Harvey study area includes the nine counties forming the Greater
Houston Metropolitan Statistical Area, the City of Houston (included at the county-level
geographical segment), and responding public agencies and organizations corresponding with the
State of Texas. Figure 1.1 illustrates the three study areas, including areas affected by Hurricane
Isaac shaded green, the Sandy region shaded blue, and the Harvey study area shaded red.
1.3.1. Hurricane Isaac
Tropical Depression Nine formed east of the Lesser Antilles in the morning hours of
August 21, 2012. The storm made landfall on Haiti and Cuba before entering the Gulf of
Mexico. Isaac was classified a Category 1 Hurricane in the afternoon of August 28 about 75
miles south of the mouth of the Mississippi River, where it eventually made landfall on southeast
Lafourche Parish of Louisiana with maximum sustained winds of 80 miles per hour. The storm
re-entered Gulf waters and made a second landfall just west of Port Fourchon, Louisiana in the
second hour of August 29. The storm slowed, continuing a northwest trajectory across Louisiana
on August 29 and 30, impacting four US states with prolonged wind, coastal flooding, and flash
flooding resulting in one death (NWS 2017).
6

The Hurricane Isaac study area encompasses four states and 123 counties including
Alabama (8 counties), Florida (12 counties), Louisiana (55 parishes), and Mississippi (48
counties). The Isaac (counties) study area stretches over about 88,000 square miles with a total
(counties) population of nearly 8.8 million and a population density averaging 111 persons per
square mile (Census 2017, FEMA 2017e). The Isaac Study Area is the largest by area, most
rural, and contains the most coastline of the three study areas.

Figure 1.1. States and Counties affected by Hurricanes Isaac, Sandy, and Harvey.
1.3.2. Hurricane Sandy
Tropical Depression Eighteen formed over the Central Caribbean on October 22, 2012,
intensifying to a Category 3 hurricane as it tracked north over Jamaica, Cuba, and the Bahamas.
Sandy made landfall near Atlantic City, New Jersey as a post-tropical cyclone with sustained
7

winds of 80 miles per hour on August 29, causing catastrophic storm surge in coastal New Jersey
and New York (Blake et al. 2013, NWS). The storm tracked west-northwest across southern
Pennsylvania until it dissipated over Ohio two days later. Sandy claimed a total of 147 lives with
72 in the US Atlantic basin (Blake et al. 2013). The event was the second costliest cyclone since
1900 at $65 billion (Blake et al. 2013).
The Hurricane Sandy study area encompasses seven states, 91 counties, and one territory
including Connecticut (7 counties), the District of Columbia, Delaware (3 counties), Maryland
(24 counties), New Jersey (21 counties), New York (14 counties), Pennsylvania (18 counties),
and Rhode Island (4 counties). The Sandy (counties) study area reaches over 41,000 square
miles with a (counties) population totaling about 36.2 million and resulting in an average
population density of nearly 8,803 persons per square mile (FEMA 2017e, Census 2017).
1.3.3. Hurricane Harvey
Hurricane Harvey emerged as a tropical wave off the coast of Africa on August 13, 2017.
The system was named the Tropical Cyclone Nine on the morning of August 17 and upgraded to
a tropical storm that afternoon. Harvey impacted the Windward Islands August 18 and entered
the Mediterranean where it weakened to a tropical wave, passing over the Yucatan Peninsula on
the 22nd. Harvey rapidly intensified following re-entry into warm Gulf waters, tracking
northwest and made a second landfall on San Jose Island on August 24 after achieving sustained
winds of 130 miles per hour and storm surge reported of up to 12 feet, where it dumped over 16
inches of rain in 24 hours before re-entering Gulf waters one final time (Ehrlich 2017, NWS
2018). The downgraded tropical storm zigzagged eastward, eventually making its final landfall
west of Cameron, Louisiana on August 30. Afterwards it took a north to northeast trajectory
across Louisiana. Disastrous flooding in the Houston area claimed 82 lives (Moravec 2017).

8

The catastrophic event resulted in a cost double of Hurricane Sandy at $125 billion (NOAA
2018).
The Hurricane Harvey study area includes nine counties in the State of Texas, known as
the Greater Houston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The Houston MSA stretches over
8,500 square miles and is home to nearly 5.9 million residents, averaging about 687 persons per
square mile (FEMA 2017e, Census 2017).
1.4. Dissertation Organization
The first chapter presented an overview of the three research objectives, the storm events,
and the study areas. Chapter two offers a review of the related literature including the theoretical
basis of the research, the findings of recent related studies, and guidelines concerning the use of
social media during emergency events, including those promulgated by the federal government.
The literature review constructs the conceptual framework of the study, suggesting better
communication between information brokers and the public may lead to enhanced community
disaster resilience through development and maintenance of durable communication networks
and investment in social capital. Chapter two also includes a review of technical documents
regarding communications in the EM field and a review of recent research concerning the SM
communication preferences of the public. The chapter concludes with a summary of challenges
and a visual conceptualization of these obstacles to social media use that have been reported in
the literature.
Chapter three includes the methods used to construct both survey instruments, the pretesting process, and survey distribution methodology. I discuss the method developed to identify
the pool of potential survey respondents and classify their organizations into types. The chapter
is structured to summarize the development and data collection for each survey instrument

9

independently but does not repeat the description of the sampling and classification methodology
for the Harvey survey, as procedures were carried over from the sampling method developed for
the first survey. The chapter includes a description of the data-cleaning steps that were applied
to remove insufficient, unclassifiable, or low-quality responses received from the two surveys.
Chapter four presents the findings of the first research objective regarding the use of SM
during the four phases of an emergency by public agencies and organizations that comprise the
whole community of EM in 2018, sampled from areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy
which occurred in 2012. The goal is to understand how different stakeholder groups, including
first responders, government-related agencies and offices, news media organizations, and nongovernment organizations use SM to supplement risk and crisis communication throughout the
four phases of EM.
The fifth chapter includes findings from the second research objective. Findings were
derived from the same survey as reported on in chapter four, investigating the challenges
reported by survey respondents, and how the they have addressed these challenges.
Chapter six presents the findings of the third research objective and reports the survey
findings from emergency responders during Hurricane Harvey around greater Houston, Texas
area in 2017. The case study examines specific SM tools used by the emergency responders
during the response phase and how they addressed common obstacles to SM use during crisis
events. The chapter concludes with recommendations for improving SM in future disasters.
The last chapter concludes the study by summarizing the findings presented in chapters
four, five, and six. The findings drawn from each of the three research objectives provide a base
from which I discuss the implications of the study and specific “take home” messages to help
guide the efforts of EM leadership and relevant personnel, and for social media developers, who

10

may help to enhance overall community disaster resilience by working with EM communication
specialists to improve the utility of social media to assist response and rescue efforts.

11

Chapter 2. Literature Review
Researchers examining sources of community resilience agree communication networks
and social capital play an important role in how well communities can withstand and recover
from large-scale disturbances (Adger 2000, Aldrich and Meyer 2015, Anderies and Janssen
2013, CARRI 2013, Holling 1973, 2001, Norris et al. 2008, Lam et al. 2016, Reams et al. 2012).
Norris and colleagues found community resilience to disasters might be influenced by adaptive
capacities and the extent to which they are robust, redundant, and rapidly accessible to
stakeholders (Norris et al. 2008).
The Four Phase Model for Emergency Management is a framework suggested by FEMA
for the development of emergency response plans (FEMA 1996, 2006). Following a disturbance
to a community, the phases of the event may be conceptualized to include response, recovery,
and mitigation before returning to preparedness. FEMA stresses that organizations and public
agencies involved in EM should maintain bi-directional communication with the public
throughout the phases.
In recent years, several federal government guidelines have been promulgated to
encourage use of new technologies for greater stakeholder engagement throughout the four
phases of EM. The 2006 Warning Alert and Response Network Act4 sought to establish a
unified national hazard alert system, leading to Wireless Emergency Alerts5 becoming
operational in 2012 (FCC 2017g). Wireless Emergency Alerts enhanced crisis communications
through use of geographically targeted text broadcasts to mobile devices within a specified zone
of emergency (FCC 2017g, US Congress 2006). Similarly, the National Emergency

4

H.R.5785 - Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act. 109th Congress (2005-2006).
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/5785/text.
5
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/wireless-emergency-alerts-wea.
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Communication Plan (NECP) of 2008 aimed to improve emergency communications following
the 9-11 attacks of 2001 and Hurricane Katrina of 2005. The NECP highlighted communication
deficiencies affecting responders’ abilities to manage incidents and support response efforts
(DHS 2006, 2008, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004, SLP 2006).
The 2008 NECP reinvented US crisis communication approaches by emphasizing the
need for ongoing communication among stakeholders during the four phases of a disaster. Risk
communication became a mechanism for maintaining open dialogue among stakeholders.
Although the 2008 NECP did not mention SM specifically, many government entities have since
incorporated SM into risk and crisis communication plans and developed manuals to help
standardize its use. By 2010, DHS acknowledged the utility of SM and pushed for development
of SM communication best-practice strategies with the formation of the SMWG. By 2012,
SMWG issued the first of eight guiding documents supporting the use of SM by responders. The
Social Media Strategy states SM can serve as a vessel to deliver alerts and warnings to “more
people, in more places, in less time” (DHS 2012).
The 2014 revision of the NECP emphasized enhancement of the communication
capabilities of responders, including updated goals and recommendations to modernize
communications following a whole-community approach to preparedness (DHS 2014). The Plan
promoted more advanced SM activities, such as a tool to “enhance situational awareness,
operational coordination, and decision-making” (DHS 2014). Despite central EM leadership
support SM tactics to pull, or collect information from trusted SM networks, recent studies
suggest the bureaucratic rigidity of NIMS may have complicated EMs abilities to embrace these
more advanced SM communication strategies (Hughes and Palen 2012).

13

2.1. Disaster Resilience, Communication, and Information
2.1.1. Disaster Resilience
The resilience of social-ecological systems depends on many factors, including the ability
to rapidly communicate risk and adapt to changing threat levels (Adger 2000, Anderies and
Janssen 2013, Holling 1973, 2001, Norris et al. 2008b, Reams et al. 2012, CARRI 2013). We
adopt Norris et al.’s (2008) definition of community resilience as “a process linking a set of
capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance,” (Norris et al.
2008) acknowledging resilience as a metaphor, a theory, a set of capacities, and with relevance to
developing strategies for disaster readiness. A community may enhance its disaster resilience by
investing in sets of networked adaptive capacities, including economic development, community
competence, information and communication, and social capital (Norris et al. 2008). Further,
adaptive capacities may be thought of as the combination of “both the resources themselves and
the dynamic attributes of those resources (robustness, redundancy, rapidity)” (Norris et al. 2008).
Authors suggest the networked adaptive capacities arising from information and communication
include the narratives being shared, responsible media participants, professional skills and
infrastructure whereby the information is shared with the public, and trusted sources of
information. Social capital capacities include perceived social support among community
stakeholders, social embeddedness or connectedness among the community members,
organizational linkages and cooperation, citizen participation in collective endeavors, sense of
community, and place attachment (Norris et al. 2008). Emergency managers investing in social
capital may support durable communication networks by encouraging bonding or n bridging
relationships across stakeholder groups, and linking stakeholders vertically by connecting
politically-influential individuals with those within marginalized social groups (Aldrich and
Meyer 2014, Adger 2010, Sherrieb, Norris, and Galea 2010, Putnam 2001).
14

In the resilience literature, information enables adaptive performance as a primary
resource in technical and organizational systems (Comfort 2005), while communication refers to
the standardization of meanings and understandings, and the existence of channels for members
to articulate their needs (Norris et al. 2008). Community resilience requires good
communication (Goodman et al. 1998), and information that is “accurate and accurately
transmitted” (Goodman et al. 1998, Norris et al. 2008). Further, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) suggests choosing the correct communication method or channel is “crucial to the
public’s health and safety,” and that “the public information official must select the right
delivery method for a particular set of circumstances” (CDC 2014). Meeting these CDC
recommendations may be complicated by the previously-mentioned restrictive dimensions of
NIMs.
FEMA Director Craig Fugate advises EMs to utilize existing networks rather than
forming new channels to interact with the community (Fugate 2011b). This advice encourages
EMs to lead the effort in selecting appropriate communication channels to supplement their
official communications with the public, and to tailor communications to those methods and
channels that are most relevant to their constituents and audiences.
Covello (1992) defined risk communication as a “process of exchanging information
among interested parties about the nature, magnitude, significance, or control of a risk” (Covello
1992). Risk communication occurs across all phases EM cycle (FEMA 2006). Risk
communication often includes strategic messaging, persuasion, and presentation, and may appear
less formal and urgent. We distinguish crisis communications as the nexus between managing
information and managing meaning during the stages of prevention, response, and post-crisis
learning (Sheppard, Janoke, and Liu 2012). Authors suggest crisis communication tends to focus
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on organizational self-image and reputation restoration. While a risk may be continuous and
constant, crises typically occur over a short period of time.
2.1.2. Social Capital
Similar to the variation in the definitions of community resilience, authors describe social
capital as both a theory and capacity, with multiple definitions existing in the literature (Norris et
al. 2008, Häuberer 2011). The concept of social capital is related to a sense of community and
place attachment. The theory refers to individuals’ abilities to invest and build capital in their
social networks as a resource from which to draw for individual gains (Norris et al. 2008) in
addition to the actual or potential capacity of resources supporting a durable communication
network by way of “membership” into collectively-backed capital (Häuberer 2011).
Emergency Managers (EMs) may have the potential to enhance community resilience to
disasters with investment in social capital and civic activity by maintaining partnerships with
stakeholders in the community (Aldrich and Meyer 2015). Authors suggest the theory of social
capital has been used to understand how communities cope during and after a disaster, based on
levels of trust in EM, collective action, and other public goods (Aldrich and Meyer 2015).
Individuals are more likely to listen and comply with public information messages such as
WEAs when EMs establish and maintain relationships of trust in the community (Hughes and
Chauhan 2015), which may lead to a reduction in time spent searching or milling for additional
information before taking self-protective action (Wood et al. 2017). The concept of information
milling is discussed in greater detail in section 2.5.
Therefore, we may deduce that risk and crisis communicators may have a positive
influence on community resilience to disasters by investing in communication methods and
networks preferred by community members. Upholding civic activity through ongoing risk
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communication may help to establish credibility and build social capital, affecting levels of
institutional trust in the community, which could raise the efficacy of public warning messages.
2.2. Social Media and Emergency Management
The abilities of EMs to meet their objectives in maintaining adequate situation awareness
for accurate decision making are continuously tested during major disasters (Wukich and Mergel
2015), but web-based communication technologies such as SM tools provide opportunities to
enhance communications by networking all stakeholder groups in a community quasi-public
forum. We operationalize the term social media as referring to popular publicly-accessible
information and communication technologies (ICT) allowing the rapid and multi-directional
exchange of multi-media and text messages through web-based channels such as Facebook,
Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, Twitter, and Nextdoor.
Researchers have documented the use of SM in disasters by public agencies, NGOs, and
by individual citizens. The literature mostly includes reports of SM as used for crisis and risk
communication in terms of adoption rates, message content, common challenge or obstacles, and
future opportunities of SM adoption (Wukich and Khemka 2017, Owen et al. 2017, Brady 2017,
Plotnick and Hiltz Starr 2016, McCormick 2016, Wukich and Mergel 2015, Luna and Pennock
2015, Flizikowski et al. 2014, Wukich and Steinberg 2013, Su et al. 2013, Hughes and Palen
2012). The proceeding literature review presents benefits and common SM challenges for EM
gathered from empirical studies investigating its use in the US. Observing the types of
challenges reported by survey respondents also contributes clues toward the progress of SM
campaign development as public agencies and NGOs progress toward the institutionalization of
SM in the manner described by Mergel and Bretschneider (2013), who propose a three-stage
model of SM adoption by government agencies. Researchers suggest during the first stage of
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SM adoption, efforts are generally decentralized, experimental, and educational when SM is
mostly used to broadcast information (Mergel and Bretschneider 2013). The second stage
contains “coordinated chaos” when informal standards emerge from the lessons learned from
experience gained growing social networks and increasing the presence of the organization
within the community (Mergel and Bretschneider 2013). The third stage includes the
materialization of clear guidelines defining behavioral standards and of new roles supporting the
institutionalization of SM in communication strategies (Mergel and Bretschneider 2013).
2.3. Social Media Use in Emergency Management Communication
As introduced in the previous chapter, a primary objective of EM is reaching all citizens
in a potentially hazardous area with a critical message in order to preserve human health and
minimize property damage. The 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 86 (PPD8) acknowledges
weaknesses in the earlier US risk and crisis communication system, and encouraged DHS to lead
the efforts to advance the National Preparedness System7. The DHS Directorate of Science and
Technology8 (S&T) invests in the ongoing enhancement of emergency communications through
development of the National Emergency Communication Plan (NECP).
While a “one-to-many” type broadcast messaging approach effectively delivers a single
message to the public through official channels and traditional media outlets such as broadcast
television or AM or FM radio, this approach may not reach all citizens in an affected area.
Emergency managers often need delivery confirmation for critical messages and need to know
whether their messages are effective, informative, and actionable (Revere et al. 2015).
Traditional one-to-many methods of information dissemination to the public have become

6

https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness
https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-system
8
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology
7
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antiquated and insufficient in meeting national EM and preparedness goals (DHS 2008, FEMA
2017d, Ripberger et al. 2014). While most EMs may agree that participating in online
communication for risk and crisis communications may help them reach a broader audience, it
also extends the duties of Public Information Officers (PIOs) or relevant staff member (Hughes
and Palen 2012, Latonero and Shklovski 2011, Su et al. 2013). The addition of new tasks
increases the workload of human resources who may be overstretched during an emergency.
Following the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Director Craig Fugate advised “we need to take our planning and
preparedness to a new level” (Fugate 2009) by taking less of a government-centric approach to
EM to reach preparedness goals (Fugate 2011a). Fugate expressed urgency to enhance and
evolve the capabilities of public safety answering points (PSAP), or 911 dispatch centers,
originally designed to serve wired rotary phones. Incorporating support of text messaging for
PSAPs would be fairly simple due to its likeness to conventional PSAP architecture, but
developing a system capable of adapting to new technologies. Web-based communications offer
an array of supplemental communication channels with advanced features such as image and
video sharing and geolocation services available on nearly every web-based communication
platform. The prevalence of smart devices allows the public to access these platforms over
broadband and mobile network connections and provides opportunity for emergency managers to
access their audiences nearly 24/7, as many smart device users keep their devices on their
person.
FEMA suggests a whole community approach to EM may help to narrow the citizengovernment information gap by participating in community engagement throughout all phases of
the EM cycle. FEMA describes the whole community of EM as individuals, families, businesses,
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faith-based and community organizations, nonprofit groups, schools and academia, media
outlets, and all levels of government including state, tribal, territorial, and federal partners
(FEMA 2017f). Involving the whole community of EM helps support the construction of
durable communication networks and trusting relationships which may be leveraged in times
when official EM resources become stretched thin.
The NECP aims to improve emergency communications with recommendations made in
retrospective reports concerning national emergencies by focusing on communication
deficiencies affecting responders’ abilities to manage incidents and support response efforts
(DHS 2008, 2006, 2004, Committee 2006). DHS engages stakeholders from federal, state, local,
and tribal agencies to realize a central vision for emergency responders to communicate “as
needed, on demand, and as authorized at all levels of government across all disciplines” (DHS
2008). The goals and objectives of the Plan aim to reach more citizens in less time with a
comprehensive, multi-level approach. Recognizing that there is no “silver bullet” solution, the
NECP “involves making improvements at all levels of government, in technology, coordination
and governance, planning, usage, and training exercises” (DHS 2008).
Although the first release of the NECP (2008) did not mention SM specifically, personnel
of many agencies had already begun experimenting with SM tools in their communications with
the public. In 2008, only about 21% of Americans used SM, but subscription to SM platforms
tripled by the release of the second version of the NECP in 2014 with 62% of Americans using at
least one SM platform (Center 2018). Director Fugate endorsed SM as a tool to minimize gaps
in communication through bi-directional communication and interagency information sharing
(Fugate 2011b). Fugate proposed EMs could benefit most by engaging active networks rather
than trying to bring the people to a new platform, and demonstrated support of SM adoption
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through FEMA’s online offering of an independent study course IS-42: Social Media and
Emergency Management9 through the Emergency Management Institute.
In 2010, DHS S&T established what is now known as the Social Media Working Group
(SMWG) with the mission to provide guidance for the use of online communication channels.
DHS S&T brings together representatives from all levels of government throughout the EM
community to develop “best practice” solutions for emergency responders and supporting
organizations during all phases of the EM cycle (DHS 2018). The Group has released eight
guiding documents for public use in its first six years, covering a range of topics from SM
adoption and development, to issues of greater complexity such as countering false information
on SM during a disaster. The SMWG materials provide guidance for risk and crisis
communicators in government agencies who wish to follow the leadership of “social media
evangelists” as described by Latonero and Shklovski (2011) or “creative intrapreneurs” as
described by Mergel and Bretschneider (2013).
2.4. Benefits of Social Media in Emergency Management
The growing use of web-based communication among the public provides an opportunity
for EMs to access large and expanding audiences. From 2012-2018, SM use in the US grew
from 18% to 77% (Smith and Anderson 2018), while US internet users grew from 83% to 89%.
The American Red Cross found SM and mobile apps were the fourth most popular sources of
emergency information during a disaster in 2010, with 79% of respondents reporting turning SM
for weather conditions and warnings (ARC 2012). The Red Cross also found over three-quarters
of survey respondents expect help to arrive within three hours when posting emergency-related
requests on SM (ARC 2012).

9

https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-42

21

The literature suggests SM has potential to contribute positively to disaster outcomes.
For example, Cooper et al. (2015) argues Twitter contributed to improved mortality and
morbidity in the aftermath of the EF-4 Tornado that struck Hattiesburg, Mississippi in 2013, and
suggests that Twitter provides a public and mental health value by connecting vital services and
resources. More specifically, researchers suggest SM has “potential for information
interconnectivity, reliability, and increasing breath for information all of which are important
features for engaging the target population,” proposing that it may help to address disparity in
access to reliable information during disasters (Cooper Jr et al. 2015). Hughes and Palen (2012)
discuss the positive role of Twitter during 2008 hurricanes Gustav and Ike, suggesting Tweets
contained more displays of information broadcasting and brokerage in such events than typical
usage (Hughes and Palen 2009). Other works suggest SM has the potential to enhance disaster
resilience by helping stakeholders to develop a trusting relationship with other members and
organizations within their community before a crisis (Hughes and Chauhan 2015).
Drawing from lessons learned regarding SM use to promote public safety during
Hurricane Sandy, the SMWG values SM for:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facilitating direct agency engagement within a community
Maintaining situational awareness about emergency events and partnership opportunity
Providing an additional method for disseminating emergency public information
Providing a method for evaluating public information
Providing a means for the community to engage in problem solving
Providing a means to meet and manage public expectations
Engaging individual connectivity and promote community resources
Building and promoting agency or organization credibility
Promoting and encouraging efficiency, credibility, and transparency
Encouraging multidirectional sharing of essential information
Encouraging behavioral change.
Source: (DHS 2013)
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2.5. Challenges and Problems with Social Media Communication
Emergency Managers may face a range of difficulties when incorporating SM into
communication strategies. Further, these challenges may change and evolve over time as public
agencies adopt and integrate SM tools in their communication with the public (Mergel and
Bretschneider 2013). Challenges arise from human interactions, technical limitations, and the
interaction of the two in “socio-technical systems”. For example, communication challenges
involving human interactions may include the concerns about the accuracy of the information
being shared. Socio-technical challenges include issues arising from the indirect nature of
human interaction through technology, such as how to handle anonymity of users encountered on
SM. Challenges stemming from the maintenance of listenable channels (such as Facebook or
Twitter) require EMs to develop bi-directional communication strategies including making
investments to incorporate such duties in the job description of communication personnel. They
also need to develop policies and protocol for addressing legal issues such as data storage,
privacy, and access to SM technology (DHS 2012a, Plotnick and Hiltz 2016).
Channel selection has consequences for accessing adequate audiences, users’ ability to
retain data, and information security. For example, Twitter data is made available for purchase,
while Facebook generally retains the data generated on their platform. The interfaces of SM
tools also vary in functionality, resulting in differing and often unclear information transmission
and retention. Uneven information sharing contributes to information asymmetries and the
potential for inaccurate information being shared (Wukich and Mergel 2015).
In addition, SM challenges may present themselves differently across the phases of the
EM cycle. Members of the public are likely to expect quick informative responses from EMs
who use SM. While some EMs may possess the resources necessary to incorporate additional

23

“as-needed” staff to monitor and respond to public information request which surge during a
crisis, a large portion of local-level responders may lack the resources necessary to maintain
listenability in non-emergency times. Providing intermittent or inconsistent listenability has the
potential to limit the overall effectiveness of communications with potential to undermine
institutional trust and erode public perception of official information brokers (Hughes and
Chauhan 2015).
A long-standing challenge of crisis communications unfolds when citizens fail to engage
in self-protective action immediately following receipt of a public warning message (Lindell and
Perry 2012). Rather, citizens often take part in information milling, turning to their own social
networks for information and guidance before re-defining the hazard and taking self-protection
action (Wood et al. 2017, Mergel 2014). The key hazard of milling is delay or hesitancy to take
self-protective action when individuals seek additional information to inform or re-define their
understanding of an unfamiliar hazardous situation. They may receive poor advice offered by
misinformed or unknowing individuals communicating within personal networks.
As members of the public increasingly use SM to communicate and access information
(Shearer 2018, Shearer 2017), some researchers also note that the use of SM rises during a crisis
(Austin, Fisher Liu, and Jin 2012). Individuals primarily use SM during a crisis to access
information and check on family and friends (Austin, Fisher Liu, and Jin 2012), and in some
situations they believe the information available on SM to be more credible than traditional news
sources (Procopio and Procopio 2007). Citizens may also turn to SM when the crisis has freshly
surfaced because traditional media has not yet covered the crisis (Austin, Fisher Liu, and Jin
2012). Participating in information milling might be negatively influenced by the information
diffusion process, in which intermediate sources relay messages to ultimate receivers (Lindell
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and Perry 2012). Here lies opportunity for responders to leverage SM tools to supplement
citizens’ informational needs with official advice and information aimed to reduce delay in
citizens taking self-protective action. Official public warning providers may supplement and
elaborate on public warnings by engaging the public through unofficial channels to provide
updates and recommend alternative trusted information sources to guide citizens towards
accurate information in hopes of avoiding the sharing of misinformation within affected
communities. Public information providers may also affect the success of information
transmission depending their ability to access the most used channels or networks among the
populations at risk.
The following section focuses on the challenges of developing and maintaining SM
campaigns for risk and crisis communicators with a sequential review of similar studies. The
review discusses difficulties, obstacles, and barriers contributed in empirical studies, and reviews
knowledge regarding the use of SM for US emergency management. We seek to understand
how SM challenges have evolved in the literature and identify enduring or inherent limitations to
social media use for emergency management.
2.5.1. Challenges of Social Media in Emergency Management in the Literature
Investigation into the use of SM tools for EM did not appear in the crisis informatics
literature in great detail before 2011, the year following the formation of the SMWG. By 2011,
one-half of the American population already used at least one SM platform, up from 5% in 2005
(Center 2018). The same year, Latonero and Shklovski (2011) presented a case study telling of a
shift in risk and crisis communication to incorporate interactivity. Authors described innovative
early adopters as social media evangelists who develop new solutions to enhance organizational
communications capacities using ICT. Researchers suggested pockets of visionaries were using
SM to enhance, and even change the nature of risk and crisis communication, by providing
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listenability and bi-directional communication. Authors presented the case of groundbreaking
use of SM by a Los Angeles County Fire Public Information Officer (PIO) Brian Humphry, who
used Twitter to monitor and collect information, and Yahoo Pipes to validate the Twitter
information without any formal education on the topic. Researchers found Humphrey faced
financial, logistical, and organization challenges, including increased workload and potentially
unstable support of SM from leadership attributed to a “disconnect” in organizational structure
and Humphrey’s SM activities (Latonero and Shklovski 2011).
Hughes and Palen (2012) interviewed 25 Colorado PIOs of sub-municipal to state-level
law enforcement, fire, city government, EM agencies, and other related organizations. Openended interview questions posed during semi-structured phone interviews provided insight
regarding how ICT such as SM affect the work of PIOs. Researchers found 80% of respondents
used SM in their job. Respondents reported struggles with the rigidity of NIMS, expressing
frustration with tasks such as gaining approval from leadership before sharing messages, who
feared the novel approach to enhancing communications could introduce unforeseen negative
consequences (Hughes and Palen 2012). Other PIOs reported great concern about the time and
resources required to support a SM campaign (Hughes and Palen 2012). Their findings
suggested that the role of the PIO was evolving from primarily that of a gatekeeper, to a
translator, as online networks allow greater accessibility and interaction with citizens and news
reporters. These findings provided evidence of the changing responsibilities and resource needs
of agencies and organizations across the nation as they participate in the online community.
Many of the PIOs interviewed sought to address these needs through the redistribution of tasks
within their organization, which may require new specializations.
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The following year, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA) found that 100% of state level EM agencies used SM “in
some capacity” with 68% of county level and 85% of local level EMs and emergency response
agencies participating in the online community (Su et al. 2013). The study compiled the
responses of 505 nation-wide representatives from EM agencies, public health, emergency
medical services (EMS), government, law enforcement, fire, and other organizations at the state,
county, and local levels. The study found seven barriers to the use of SM, with the primary
challenge being a lack of dedicated personnel for SM campaigns (Su et al. 2013). While almost
one-quarter of respondents reported no primary barrier to agency use of SM, the majority of
respondents also reported difficulties stemming from a lack of leadership, funding, established
procedures, training, and knowledge of SM (Su et al. 2013).
Next, Wukich and Mergel (2015) sought to understand how public agencies use SM to
empower citizens across the four phases of EM, focusing on the extent of use by state-level EMs.
Researchers highlighted several problems including information milling on SM limiting the
effectiveness of official messages, information asymmetries emerging as messages are not shared
uniformly within social networks, and the unknown accuracy of the information shared on SM
(Wukich and Mergel 2015). They concluded that (1) a large portion of agency communications
occurred concerning prevention, mitigation, and preparedness topics; (2) agencies push
information to and request feedback via one-to-many messages; (3) agencies engaged in manyto-many modes of communication for rumor management (Wukich and Mergel 2015).
Challenges include coordinating multi-actor networks, information asymmetries, inaccurate
information sharing, and maintaining the resources required to for constant monitoring in order
to preform rumor control. Authors recommended agencies build relationships prior to extreme
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events to maximize the reach of their communications and trust of the community (Wukich and
Mergel 2015).
Plotnick and Starr (2016) identified technical and organizational barriers to SM use in a
two-part study of county-level emergency management agencies. They found that about half of
EMs use SM, while another quarter of EMs actually prohibit its use. First, researchers mapped
the barriers to SM use with information gained through eleven interviews with EMs across the
nation resulting in six primary barriers. The barriers included a lack of time and personnel, lack
of formal policies, prohibition of SM, lack of training, data accuracy, and information overload
(Plotnick and Hiltz Starr 2016). The second part of the study included a large sample survey in
which respondents indicated insufficient staff was the greatest barrier for both pushing and
pulling information through SM (Plotnick and Hiltz 2016). The second and third top barriers
related to pushing information were lack of guidance and policy, and lack of skills respectively
(Plotnick and Hiltz 2016). The top technical barriers to pulling information though SM include
trustworthiness and information overload when observing data streams exceed human capacity
(Plotnick and Hiltz Starr 2016). They suggested formal policies and procedure related to SM
were quickly evolving among their study participants.
Lastly, McCormick (2016) discussed internal and external challenges for the use of SM
based on nineteen interviews of EMs in the US. The top internal challenges include staffing
shortages, policies, and restrictive institutional infrastructure. External-type challenges included
data verification, security of information, liability issues, and subjectivity that may affect the
accuracy or validity of information gathered from SM, such as measuring the extent of damage
virtually through SM information (McCormick 2016). McCormick hypothesizes that adoption of
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SM by EMs is influenced by access to resources, acceptance by leadership, and the amount of
prior exposure to SM tools (McCormick 2016).
2.5.2. Shifting Public Communication Preferences
Over the past decade, emergency managers have been encouraged to keep up with
changing modes of communication in the US, including monitoring of SM streams (Su et al.
2013). Communication preferences have undergone dramatic shifts in the last three decades with
integration and development of SM. Internet provider America Online may deserve the credit
for changing the way we communicate through the development of Instant Messenger (AIM) in
1997. The retired desktop software application featured real-time exchange of one-to-one and
many-to-many type messages to other users signed in to AIM regardless of their internet
provider. At its peak in 2001, AIM was the most popular messaging service in the US with 100
million users, a value representing about 71% of total internet users in the US at the time
(Neuman 2017, Live Internet Stats 2016). In the same year, Paul (2001) found internet users
preferred interactive sources to fixed-information sources for disaster communication. The
portion of Americans accessing the internet has nearly doubled since 2000, soaring from 48% to
89% in 2018 (Anderson, Perrin, and Jiang 2018).
A 2014 survey of American adults found text communications are preferred over voice
communication, with only 10% of the population reporting using a home landline “a lot”
(Newport 2014). While 77% of Americans carried a smartphone in 2016, 95% had a mobile
phone of some sort (Pew Research Center 2017). The growth in accessibility to mobile devices
has implications for both broadband internet subscription and desktop/laptop ownership, which
have declined since 2016 (Pew Research Center 2017). Mobile applications and push
notifications have shaped Americans’ relationship with information and communication by
enabling near constant contact with social network, news, and entertainment. Although only 5%
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of Americans used SM in 2005, Pew found 69% of US adults used various SM platforms in
2018, suggesting SM has potential to reach a large and growing audience greater than 227
million Americans (Pew Research Center 2018, US Census Bureau 2018).
Luna and Pennock’s (2015) review of SM use in four disasters from 2005 to 2012 helps
to classify common SM challenges, based on the primary division among social and technical
challenges. Authors build on the four-phase knowledge contributed by Clayton Wukich,
focusing on the conceptualization of SM challenges reported in the literature. Figure 2.1
illustrates an adaption of Luna and Pennock’s (2015) organization of SM difficulties, splitting
them into two groups, including social and technical with subgroups breaking down more
complex challenges of SM use in EM, as well as an overview of community resilience theory
and the role of SM in building social capital. Authors define social challenges as those caused
by interactions: (1) among individuals, (2) between individuals and organizations, and (3) among
organizations. Social challenges emerge with multiple interactions among stakeholders,
including the dissemination of information, detection of irony, misinformation, and information
verification and validation (Luna and Pennock 2015). Technical challenges are distinguished as
difficulties stemming from “physical and logistical resources required to functionally support the
development” in the EM community (Luna and Pennock 2015). While technical challenges may
be primarily a product of policies, protocol, and a lack of investment in SM communication,
social challenges tend to be more unpredictable and complex, such as detecting irony in the
messages posted by individuals.
This chapter provided an overview of the key obstacles, barriers, and challenges reported
in the literature. Challenges to the use of SM in the whole community of EM presented in the six
studies discussed above are summarized in Appendix A including the study citation, condition
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observed, study type, study size (n), respondent profile, and findings listing reported obstacles.
This review of related research provided insights that we applied in the design of the survey
instruments introduced in the following chapter. We apply Norris et al.’s (2008) community
resilience framework as a theoretical base to investigate SM as a tool to increase the availability
of accurate information and effectiveness of communication by the EM community, and thus,
enhance overall community resilience to disasters. We focus on two capacities presented by
Norris et al. (2008) including information and communication and social capital, to explore the
use of SM as a pathway to enhance disaster resilience. Mergel and Bretschneider’s (2013) threestage framework of SM adoption by government agencies provides guidance to investigate how
the reported challenges of SM communication in the EM community may indicate progress
made toward institutionalization of SM.

Figure 2.1. Obstacles for the Use of Social Media in Emergency Management,
adapted from Luna and Pennock (2015).
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Chapter 3. Data and Methods
The third chapter introduces two survey instruments, describes questionnaire
development, and study population sampling for areas affected by the 2012 Hurricanes Isaac and
Sandy and for Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The first survey was designed to gather information
about SM use by members of the whole community of EM throughout all phases of EM in areas
affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy. The second survey focuses only on one of the four
phases, the response phase, and examines social media use among governmental and nongovernmental groups who were active during the response phase of Hurricane Harvey.
3.1. Survey I: Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy Study Areas
3.1.1. Population Sampling
The target audience includes public agencies and organizations associated with the whole
community of EM within the study area. The sampling method reflects the local focus of the
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) by targeting county/parish-level first
responders (FR), governmental offices and agencies (GOV), news media organizations (NEWS),
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and also incorporates regional and state-level and
national-level organizations for a more complete sample of the EM community. Twitter was
chosen as the SM platform from which to identify the study population. We identified potential
survey respondents by first combining the names of affected counties/parishes with keywords
emergency, disaster, news, police, and fire in the Twitter Search toolbar, then narrowing the
search to “people”. Queries were repeated with state names, and then with state abbreviations.
Twitter accounts were included upon meeting three requirements:
1. Twitter account represents an organization assumed active in risk or crisis
communication based on the definition of “whole community” of EM.
2. Twitter account corresponds with a county or state of the study area.
3. Twitter news feed includes greater than ten user-generated posts.
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Next, the names and acronyms of agencies and organizations known for their
involvement in EM were paired with study area place names, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

American Red Cross (ARC) – Queried as “Red Cross”
Chambers of Commerce – Queried as “Chamber”
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Queried as “Homeland Security”
Emergency Management Agency (EMA)
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
National Weather Service (NWS)
Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Principle Information Officer (PIO)
Salvation Army (SA)
Special Emergency Response Team (SERT)
United Way (UW)
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD)

Lastly, all keywords were queried into Twitter Search without geographic place names to
identify national level organizations participating in risk and crisis information. If the search
method did not return the Twitter profiles of any relevant agencies and organizations in a queried
study area segment, we adopted Hughes’ (2014) assumption guiding their sampling procedure by
accepting that the expected profiles we did not locate either did not exist at the time of sampling,
or accounts were not optimized for discovery through basic Twitter Search queries (Hughes et al.
2014).
Twitter sampling resulted in identification of 1,668 organizations and agencies
representing the whole community of EM operating within the Isaac and Sandy study areas. The
study population is summarized in Table 3.1. The organizations are categorized as combined
government-related (GOC-C) and combined non-government related (NGO-C). Data collected
from the Twitter pages and linked websites contributed to survey distribution, internal coding,
and population analysis. Data collection fields included organization name, organization type,
estimated geographic range, Twitter network and activity statistics, age of account, and
33

indication of officially verified accounts. Linked websites provided email addresses and
hyperlinks of Facebook pages and web forms. We used this information to contact the
organizations directly and invite them to participate in the survey as described in section 3.1.3
below.
Table 3.1. Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy Study Population Counts
per Study Area Segment

3.1.2. Questionnaire Development
The first year of the study was devoted to the research and development of a
questionnaire following a review of literature regarding the subjects of emergency management
in the US, social media, community resilience, and the intersection of these subjects.
The survey instrument was developed over six months with the input of researchers from
the ICAR researchers research team at Louisiana State University.
The final version of the survey instrument was 28 questions focused on the four
components mentioned previously. Response formats included categorical multiple choice,
Likert-type matrix tables, “yes/no,” and open response. The survey instrument was adapted for
Qualtrics online survey software and prepared for pretesting, including the temporary addition of
five evaluation questions. The survey instrument is included in Appendix B for reference.
Survey pretesting was executed in January 2018. The method selected for pretesting
includes qualitative and quantitate feedback gathered through participant debriefing and expert
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evaluation. Participant selection involved convenience and (restrictive) snowball sampling
targeting a population of n=31. Feedback was offered by non-profits and other NGOs, news
media organizations, communication experts, content experts, and ICAR Researchers.
Qualitative and quantitative evaluations were collected with in-survey evaluation questions and
through email correspondence.
The five evaluation questions added to the end of the survey sought feedback regarding
survey comprehensiveness, potential additional questions we should add, content sensitivity,
survey length, and response likeliness if the participants were invited to participate in the study
over SM direct messaging. Expert evaluation during one-on-one interviews provided various
suggestions regarding visual aspects, missing content, ambiguity, and general wording within the
questions and/or response options. The pretesting process resulted valuable insight regarding
content, design, delivery, and the general appearance of the survey. These recommendations
were used to make small changes to eight of the 28 questions. The refined survey was made
available online in full and mobile formats to anyone with access to the survey link.
3.1.3. Survey Distribution
We distributed the survey instrument from February 2, 2018 through April 25, 2018 with
the delivery of invitations via web form submission, email, Twitter Direct Message, and
Facebook Messenger. Web forms often found on the “contact us” section of websites
contributed 205 survey invitations. We emailed invitations to 984 potential respondents, of
which 33 were returned. We sent three reminder emails to increase response rates, followed by a
message thanking survey respondents for their contribution to the study.
Next, 101 personalized invitations were extended to potential respondents through
Twitter Direct Message over several days. Messages directed to the corresponding public
Table 3.2. Results of Survey I Invitation through Social Media Outreach
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Facebook pages located for 65% of the study population contributed the extension of 1,094
personalized invitations delivered over eleven weeks. Greater availability of direct messaging on
Facebook pages suggesting greater potential to obtain survey responses existed through
Facebook, while the majority of Twitter users do not Direct Messaging on Twitter. Finally, we
sent reminder messages to 231 Facebook accounts indicating receipt of messages without reply.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of social media outreach for survey distribution, and as an initial
indicator to classify how the members of the whole community of EM use SM tools to
communicate bi-directionally.
Table 3.2: Survey I Social Media Outreach Messaging Results

3.1.4. Data Collection and Cleaning
The survey was made available from February until July 2018. We collected 309 total
responses, of which 40 were omitted from analysis. Partially completed surveys were observed
for analysis under the assumption that respondents may not have held their present role
supporting SM communication in 2012, and thus were unable to answer questions about their
organization’s historic use of SM.
Data cleaning was necessary to reclassify ambiguous self-classifications and to arrange
the data for analysis in SPSS 24 statistical software and Excel spreadsheets, where visualizations
(tables and figures) were developed. First, responses with a completion rate under 24% were
excluded from analysis, yielding an average of 90% completion rate on average among responses
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retained for analysis. Next, respondents selecting other to the self-classification screening
question were analyzed and sorted into one of four valid response categories based on text
responses and investigation of identifying embedded fields. Verification of anonymous
organization type using email address and Twitter handles resulted in the re-classification of 25
responses. Data cleaning resulted in a dataset of n=269 responses suitable for further analysis.
3.1.5. Survey I Data Analysis
The survey data was imported into Excel spreadsheets and arranged for visual
examination with color coding to aid in the visual identification the categories of survey
respondents. For the open-ended questions, common themes were noted and recorded, then
organized by respondent groups.
An initial analysis was necessary to convert Likert-type responses into absolute values
representing frequency. I examined the differences in reported SM communications across the
four phases of EM by calculating average-weighted scores to indicate “level of use” of SM in
each phase using a four-option Likert-type set of questions. The weights of frequency options
include never = 0, sometimes = 0.25, most of the time = 0.75, and always = 1.0. I had provided
respondents with definitions and examples of activities per phase, including:
• Mitigation: Preventing future emergencies or minimizing their effects (For example:
conducting inspections of building safety).
• Preparedness: Preparing to handle an emergency (For example: stocking hurricane
supplies).
• Response: Responding safely to an emergency (For example: checking official news
sources before returning to an affected area).
• Recovery: Recovering from an emergency (For example: rebuilding stronger after a
disaster).
Phase-specific response scores then were calculated for each organization type, per
phase, where a greater value reflects more SM use. The sum of phase scores of respondents
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served as a measure of their use of SM for risk and crisis communication across all phases of
emergency management.
3.2. Survey II: Hurricane Harvey Study Area
3.2.1. Results of Population Sampling
The sampling methodology developed to identify potential survey respondents for the
first survey was applied to the Hurricane Harvey study area by querying keyword combinations
and direct searches into Twitter Search between December 2017 and January 2018. The Harvey
study area is defined as the State of Texas, the nine counties of the Houston Metropolitan
Statistical Area, and the City of Houston. The sample also contains the same national level
organizations identified in sampling for first survey.
Information used to identify and classify data was collected from the biographical cards
of Twitter pages including Twitter handles, organization names, location, and links to other web
pages. Email addresses and Facebook profile addresses were collected from websites to provide
alternative channels to invite potential survey respondents to participate in the study. Lastly,
each potential respondent was classified into reference groups describing the nature of the
organization. Sampling resulted in the identification of 299 potential survey respondents, of
which 69% operate at the county or local levels. Corresponding Facebook pages were located
for 220 cases, or about three-quarters of the Twitter sample.
3.2.2. Questionnaire Development
The second survey was developed between September 2017 and May 2018 with input
from ICAR researchers. The final version of the questionnaire contained 23 questions, and is
included in Appendix C for reference.
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3.2.3. Survey Distribution
Survey distribution occurred in June 2018 by extending invitations to the study
population through four channels. First, 60 invitations were submitted to web forms on
interactive websites. Next, invitations were sent to 21 potential survey respondents enabling the
feature, or about the 7% of the study population. Then, we extended invitations to 230, or 81%
of the study population who enable Facebook Messenger. Together, these channels resulted in
74 survey responses from respondents clicking anonymous links provided in the invitation text.
Finally, invitations sent to 113 email addresses of potential survey respondents resulted in the
collection of 16 survey responses.3.2.4.
3.2.4. Data Collection and Cleaning
Survey responses were collected from the last week of June 2018 until the last week of
December 2018, although only one survey response was obtained after the first week of
September. We obtained a total of 90 survey responses but excluded 26 for problems including
inadequate completion rates (< 50%) and unclassifiable responses. Excluding three respondents
taking more than three hours to complete the survey, the average response time was 10:42. The
average completion rate was 95%. Local and county level organizations contributed the greatest
response rates, followed by state, then national level organizations. Table 3.3 summarizes the
origin of 64 survey responses used for analysis compared to the sum of accounts sampled within
corresponding study area segments of the Hurricane Harvey study area.
3.2.5. Survey II Data Analysis
The analysis of the second survey results was performed in a similar manner as the first
analysis. The cleaned dataset was imported into Excel spreadsheets and color-coded to aid the
identification of the respondent groups.
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This chapter presented an overview of the survey development, administration, and data
collection. The next three chapters present the findings of the analyses conducted on the two
surveys to address the research objectives of this dissertation.
Table 3.3. Hurricane Harvey Survey Response Rates per Study Area
Segment
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Chapter 4. Social Media Adoption, Utilization, Campaign Evaluation, and
Barriers to Use
The first research objective explores patterns of social media (SM) use for risk and crisis
communication among public agencies and organizations active in emergency management
(EM) in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012. Using the results of the first
survey described in the previous chapter, the findings yield new insights on five topics including
the extent of SM use, the functions and perceived potential benefits of SM, barriers to SM use
reported by non-users, the specific channels preferred by respondents, and reported levels of SM
communication activity across the four phases of EM.
4.1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Survey responses were analyzed in four groups to explore how first responders (FR),
government agencies and offices (GOV), news media organizations (NEWS), and nongovernment organizations (NGO) each use SM for risk and crisis communication. Figure 4.1
illustrates the composition of responses by organization type in the large pie chart, and
jurisdictional reach (local, county, state or national) for each respondent group. The first
responders group includes fire departments, search and rescue services, law enforcement,
emergency medical services (EMS), and the US Coast Guard. The government-related agencies
and offices group includes EM agencies, emergency operations centers, and supporting offices
such as administrative divisions, departments of transportation, and other offices with SM
accounts used to issue public-service alerts or to interact with citizens. The news media group
includes broadcast television news stations, talk radio, local periodicals, and community news
pages. Non-government organizations include charitable organizations, chambers of commerce,
religious groups, community organizations, and other non-profits known for contributing to risk
communication and information sharing during recovery efforts.
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Figure 4.1. Composition of Survey Respondents by Organization Type
and Geographic Reach. Data Source: Survey Questions 1.1, 1.2.
Of the 269 survey responses, 213 (79%) were submitted by agencies and NGOs
representing local and county/parish jurisdictions. State-level respondents contributed
approximately 15% of responses, followed by just 6% representation by respondents with
national range or jurisdiction. Most of the respondents reporting a national reach were NGOs,
including the Red Cross and Salvation Army.
4.2. Extent of Social Media Use
Research Question 1.1: What is the role of social media among public agencies and
NGO respondents?
4.2.1. Social Media Adoption Rates
Ninety percent of respondents reported using SM for risk and crisis communication, a
rate of SM use that is consistent with the recent findings of other researchers (Su et al. 2013,
Plotnick and Hiltz 2016). Figure 4.2 illustrates the incidence of SM non-use by survey
respondents (left) and the composition of respondents indicating non-use (right). While only 10
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percent of the survey respondents report not using SM for risk and crisis communication, the rate
of NGOs not using SM is nearly three times greater than the overall average. Almost 28% of
NGOs report they do not use SM, followed by 14% of first responders, almost 4% of GOVs, and
2% of news media organizations.

Figure 4.2. Incidence of Social Media use (left) and Composition of Respondents not Using
Social Media (right). Data Source: Survey Question 1.4.
4.2.2. Attitudes and Expectations Concerning Social Media
The first step in understanding how respondents use SM is determining what they expect
to gain from it. While the value of SM communication by public agencies and organizations
may be limited by organizational resources (such as staff availability, hardware, policy, or
protocol), researchers (Hughes 2014, Su et al. 2013) point out the importance of attitudes and
perceptions in willingness to adopt and invest resources in the use of SM tools. For example, an
individual with a positive attitude toward the usefulness of SM is more likely to benefit from it
than users with a doubtful position concerning its potential benefits.
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Survey respondents were asked to provide information regarding their expectations,
attitudes and purposes for utilization of SM in their risk and crisis communication with the
public. Respondents provided feedback regarding their agreement with six potential roles of SM
in their organizations in a seven-level Likert-type response matrix, where 1 = strongly disagree
and 7 = strongly agree. Figure 4.3 illustrates agreement concerning roles of SM among
respondents, sorted by sum-of- mean Likert Scores. Of the six potential roles of SM listed in the
survey, respondents reported the most agreement that SM will play a greater role in the future,
followed by its ability to supplement primary means of communication through other media
outlets, and its ability to assist and inform official disaster-response strategies. Respondents
collectively report less agreement with the ability of SM tools to collect information from the
public through two-way communications and to serve as primary communications. Respondents

Figure 4.3. Roles of Social Media in Risk and Crisis Communication. Data Source:
Survey Question 3.14. N=208
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report the least agreement with the ability of SM tools to identify individuals in need of
assistance, suggesting an important limitation of SM use in emergency- response efforts.
Overall, NEWS respondents reported the highest Likert scores in Figure 4.3 where a
greater score indicates more agreement with the potential roles of SM, thus suggesting
respondents place a greater value on these potential benefits. News media organization value
SM most as a means for collecting information from the public through bi-directional
communication. Non-government organization respondents reported the second-greatest
agreement overall with the roles and potential benefits of SM listed above, and felt strongest of
any group that it will play a greater role in the future of risk and crisis communication.
Government-related respondents reported less potential value of SM as a tool to conduct twoway communication with the public or to serve as a primary communication method. First
responders reported the least agreement with their organizations potentially benefiting from the
five functions of SM overall, but also feel most strongly that it will play a greater role in their
futures. These results may be partially explained by Plotnick and Starr’s (2016) findings
suggesting a quarter of EMs surveyed reported organizational prohibition of SM. Despite
potential organizational barriers, both FR and GOV respondents agree that SM will play a
greater role in the future of risk and crisis communication.
While respondents relying on the National Incident Command System (NIMS) (FR and
GOV) report similar numbers of organizational objectives or purposes for SM, the responses
from organizations independent of NIMS (NEWS and NGO) indicated greater variation. The
reported variation suggests that NEWS and NGO respondents use SM for different functions,
while FR and GOVs pursue and value similar functions of SM. Such variation in the responses
may also be attributed to the differences among the respondents in terms of their organizations’
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overall mission. These findings reflect optimism across all respondent groups for the
enhancement of communications with SM in the future as supplementary public communication
channels, but report greater reservation with its ability to identify individuals in need of
assistance. These results illustrated in Figure 4.3 suggest fewer respondents may be comfortable
with the more advanced SM activities recommended by EM leadership. Rather, SM appears to
be used mostly to supplement other existing communication methods.
4.2.3. Anticipated Benefits
All respondent groups perceive SM as likely being beneficial to EM as a way to extend
the reach of communications, increase public engagement, facilitate improving situational
awareness and crowdsourcing information, and as a source of news and information. These
findings are presented in Table 4.1. The most likely potential benefit reported by all respondent
groups is to facilitate increasing public engagement. About one-quarter (24%) of NIMSsupported respondents also agreed the least-likely potential benefit of SM is being a tool for
improving situational awareness and crowdsourcing information. Hesitation or uncertainty
toward observing information or data collection on SM for decision-making is consistent with
recent studies, which suggest public information brokers typically use SM tools to broadcast
information to the public, but have limited involvement with data collection on SM due to
complex issues including information accuracy and availability of human resources (Su et al.
2013, Hughes and Palen 2012, Luna and Pennock 2015, Plotnick and Hiltz Starr 2016).

About one in five (18%) of NGO respondents also reported uncertainty about the
likelihood of SM to enhance their situational awareness and for accurate crowdsourced
information. News media respondents indicated similar levels of uncertainty (19%) in two
fields, including providing means to reach more people than traditional media and as a source of
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news and information. While the finding may be expected from news media organizations, these
finding are interesting as more than two-thirds (67%) of Americans reported getting at least some
of their news from SM in 2017, with one in five sourcing news from SM “often” (Mitchell
2017).
Table 4.1. Potential Future Benefits of Social Media. Data Source: Survey Question 3.22.
N=194.

4.2.4. Potential for Improving Disaster Resilience with Social Media
Respondents provided suggestions through their responses to open-ended questions
concerning how to improve disaster resilience using SM. Open-ended response format allows
respondents to make recommendations that could benefit communities even if such advice is
beyond the organizational capacities of respondents’ organizations. Of the 47 text responses, 41
contributed meaningful feedback. Responses were coded and reduced to nine themes sorted by
response count, as shown in Table 4.2. The most common recommendation among all groups
coincides with advice of risk and crisis communication literature, which suggests vast benefits
may result from organizational efforts to actively network and engage citizens on unofficial
channels during all phases of the EM cycle. Emergency managers who build relationships in the
community during the “quiet phases” of the EM cycle have the opportunity to develop credibility
and a reputation for reliability among SM users (Hughes and Chauhan 2015, Janoke, Liu, and
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Sheppard 2012). Public information providers may extend the reach of emergency
communications by focusing on building trusting relationships with the public who may then
perceive the information as valuable and are willing to share it among their personal networks
(Wukich and Mergel 2015). Such social capital is valuable and may be accessed when
organizational resources are stretched thin by leveraging citizens to crowdsource information and
enhance situational awareness (Wardell and Su 2011, DHS 2012b, a, 2013, Aldrich and Meyer
2014, DHS 2014b).
Table 4.2. Common Themes for Improving Disaster Resilience with Social Media. Data
Source: Survey Question 3.21. N=47.

The second recommendation for enhancing disaster resilience with social media is to
increase social media subscription in the community. A first responder suggested “we are not
confident that we are reaching all residents who require emergency messages” despite ongoing
promotion of their Facebook, NIXEL, and Twitter pages. Another suggests their audiences are
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stubborn avoiders of SM, while others mentioned struggling with getting their elderly audience
to adopt SM tools.
Fortunately, survey results published by the Pew Research Center suggest the pockets of
Americans not using the internet continues to shrink. Researchers report only 11% of Americans
did not access the internet in 2018, which is down four points in three years (Anderson, Perrin,
and Jiang 2018). The same reports found 34% of seniors (age 65+) still avoided accessing the
internet in 2018, although internet non-use among seniors has fallen eight points since 2015.
Pew survey results indicate about 41% of seniors use Facebook, followed by 40% accessing
YouTube (Anderson, Perrin, and Jiang 2018). Additionally, Pew reported Americans
increasingly access news online (43% in 2017) as reliance on television (TV) news continues to
fall. From 2016 to 2017, the gap between those accessing news via TV compared to the internet
fell from 12% to only a 7% gap in news sources (Gottfried 2017). The following year, Pew
reported 43% of Americans accessed news on Facebook alone, while 68% reported ever getting
their news through SM (Masta 2018). Lastly, Pew reported 81% of Americans owned a
smartphone in 2019, up eight and a half percent since 2015 (Taylor and Silver 2019). The
findings suggest Americans continue to access the internet, social media, and smart phones at a
growing rate. While online audiences and subscriptions to SM continue to grow, Americans are
increasingly making the switch to internet-based news as reliance on TV news continues to fall.
These trends suggest that while some individuals still abstain from web-based communication
technologies, these pockets of individuals continue to shrink, thus offering a diverse and
expanding audience to engage through unofficial communication channels such as SM.
The third recommendation seeks the partnership of SM technicians and program
developers to make SM more user friendly and accessible for EM. The majority of responses
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coded to this theme mention altering SM algorithms specifically in order to reduce competition
and/or prioritize the placement of risk-related messages to the top of news feeds. Other
respondents suggest improving and expanding existing features such as Facebook Safety Check
could benefit response and rescue efforts. Other less common recommendations included
increasing human resources to address rumor control and to improve the accuracy and speed of
information sharing, cross posting information on multiple SM platforms, and using SM to
supplement official communications. The full set of anonymized original responses may be
viewed in Appendix E, including the number of coded common themes from Table 4.2.
The coded responses show similarities with SMWG materials, including all except one of
the six “benefits of social media for public safety” in the Social Media Strategy, which allows
the community to engage in solving problems. From Lessons Learned: Social Media and
Hurricane Sandy, these themes coincide with six of the eleven suggested uses for social media.
In addition to crowdsourced problem solving, SMWG found SM valuable for evaluating pubic
information, providing a means to meet and manage public expectations, encouraging
multidirectional sharing of essential information, and encouraging behavior changes to enhance
public safety.
4.2.5. Four Phase Social Media Use
Survey respondents reported using SM most during the response phase, followed by the
preparedness and recovery phases. All groups report the least amount of SM use during the
mitigation phase. Table 4.3 lists the phase-specific response scores of each group, including a
column with the sum of scores indicating an overall level of reported involvement and a row
showing the total reported participation of all respondents in each phase.

50

Table 4.3. Phase Specific Response Scores of Reported Involvement in Risk and Crisis
Communication across the Phases of Emergency Management (EM)

GOVs report the highest level of SM use overall and during every phase individually.
This finding may be attributed to greater awareness of risk and crisis communication practices
among public agencies since they are more subject to the guidelines of the National Response
Framework and plans like the NECP, highlighting the importance of ongoing communications
across all phases. The majority of GOV respondents include local EM agencies, emergency
operations centers, and public safety offices charged with “coordination and communications
during incidents by disseminating alerts and warnings and operating emergency operations
centers, among other key functions” (DHS 2014).
Since 2008, the NECP has prioritized the improvement of communication capabilities of
law enforcement, fire, and EMS personnel to ensure access to “reliable and interoperable
communications at all times in order to save lives, protect property and the environment,
stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs following an incident” (DHS 2014). First
responders report the second most involvement with SM overall, with the second greatest scores
in prepared, response, and mitigation phases. First responders report the least SM use of any
group during the recovery phase, possibly reflecting the response-centric nature of fire, law
enforcement, and emergency medical personnel.
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News media and NGOs similarly report the least amount of involvement with SM for risk
and crisis communication. While NEWS respondents report slightly more SM use during
mitigation and preparedness phases, NGOs report contributing more during response and
recovery phases. These findings reflect the organizational missions and nature of each of the two
groups. News media organizations continuously share risk-related information through regular
newscasts and publications, while NGOs such as chambers of commerce or faith-based groups
tend to be more active in community recovery.
4.2.6. Barriers to Social Media Use
One in ten survey respondents reported not using social media in the introductory
screening questions, and thus were not asked to provide feedback regarding their use of SM.
Rather, these respondents answered two questions before ending the survey asking why they do
not use SM for risk and crisis communication, and whether they had plans to incorporate SM
into their communication strategies in the future. Reasons for non-use of SM that had been
reported in similar studies informed the eight multiple-choice response options (Su et al. 2013,
Wukich and Mergel 2015, Plotnick and Hiltz 2016). The reported barriers to SM use by
respondents are summarized in Figure 4.5.
The most-reported barrier to the use of SM among non-users was not our organization’s
mission. The majority of user suggesting it was not their mission to use SM for risk and crisis
communication were NGOs, followed by FRs, the only NEWs respondent reporting non-use, and
a GOV respondent. As the most common barrier to use of SM relates more to the attitudes and
perceptions of respondents rather than a scarcity, this finding provides insight for EM leadership
hoping to gain greater participation by key community stakeholders, or the whole community of
EM. The second most-reported barrier social media has a limited ability to reach our target
audience, an education or awareness-based barrier, and a lack of human resources, a resource52

related barrier selected exclusively by first responders. Lesser reported barriers included a lack
of policy or protocol regarding social media use, lack of training or skills, lack of technology
resources, and uncertainty of information on SM. Lastly, no respondents reported lacking
financial resources as a barrier to adoption of SM tools. This finding suggests financial support
is no longer perceived as a major barrier to SM use as suggested in the literature (Flizikowski et
al. 2014, Su et al. 2013). The limited incidence of barriers found to be “major” in previous
studies may suggest the challenges of EMs may be shifting as public agencies and organizations
gain experience with SM, which is the topic of focus in the following chapter.

Figure 4.4. Reported Barriers to the use of Social Media among Non-Users. Data Source:
Survey Question 1.5. N=29.
Finally, we asked SM non-users about their plans to adopt SM tool in the future. The
findings illustrated in Figure 4.5 suggests most non-users plan to adopt SM tools despite
reporting barriers previously. NGO respondents overwhelmingly acknowledge the desire to
adopt SM, while the other three groups report less certainty.
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Figure 4.5. Plans to Adopt Social Media Tools among the Non-Users. Data Source: Survey
Question 1.6. N=24.
4.3. Preferred Social Media Tools
Research Question 1.2: Which specific social media platforms or channels do survey
respondents prefer when communicating with the public?
Survey respondents indicated their frequency of responding to public comments received
through fourteen web-based channels, ranging from never to always. Figure 4.6 illustrates the
channels respondents ever respond to public comments through based on binary classification of
the frequency data to represent ever and never as a proxy of ownership. Excluding 36
respondents who skipped this survey question, the data reclassification demonstrates Facebook is
the most popular of the fourteen web-based channels. Overall, 97% of respondents report
responding to public comments on Facebook at least sometimes, including 100% of NGOs and
98% of GOVs. Behind email and website correspondence, the second most common SM tool
used by respondents is Twitter, used by 84% of respondents. Twitter is most popular among
NEWS respondents, with 91% indicating responding to public comments at least sometimes.
Twitter was used to identify the study population, and may be falsely distorted to overrepresent
utilization. Interestingly, Facebook accounts were located for only about 60% of the study
population populated by searching Twitter. The third most-used SM channel is Instagram, with
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52% of respondents indicating account ownership. The most common stakeholder groups on
Instagram include 60% of NGOs and 57% of NEWS respondents.

Figure 4.6. Channels Preferred by Survey Respondents. Data Source: Survey Question
2.7. N=229.
While many Americans may still prefer to consume television (TV) news rather than
going online, public preferences appear to be shifting away from television and printed media.
The Pew Research Center reports declining TV news and growing online news preferences have
sharply narrowed the gap in news source preference from a 19% in 2016, to only 7% choosing
TV over online news sources in 2017 (Gottfried 2017). While Americans aged 65 and older
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report making the greatest shift online recently, ages 30-45 report the sharpest decline in
preferring TV news (Gottfried 2017). As printed newspaper periodical subscriptions continue to
plummet, so has traffic on the websites of periodicals between 2016 and 2017 (Barthel 2018).
Approximately one half (43%) of Americans use Facebook to access news, a rate three times
greater (12%) than Twitter (Masta and Shearer 2018). Pew findings suggest Americans
increasingly choose web-based news, but not necessarily from the websites of traditional news
media. These findings support Hughes and Palen (2012) findings of shifting “information
pathways” in which the role of public information officers (PIO) shift from a role of gatekeeper
to translator.
Knowing which channels are most likely monitored by organizations would help citizens
gauge the likelihood of a quick response to questions or needs they may share. For example,
nearly half (45%) of the respondents report always responding to questions from the public over
Facebook. Additionally, about 37% always respond on Twitter, followed by about 16% on
Instagram and 2% on Snapchat. Another way to visualize communication channel preferences of
agencies and NGOs is to sort the survey responses by choice count ratios of respondents
selecting always for each respondent group, as shown in Figure 4.7, where darker green
illustrates more support for bi-directional communication and red indicates the proportion of
respondents never using a channel within the respondent groups.
The findings illustrated in Figure 4.7 suggests some patterns in preference for SM
channels or platforms exist among the respondent groups. First responders and GOVs both
report always responding to questions via Websites most often, followed by Email and
Facebook. These finding are somewhat consistent with the findings of Hughes and Palen (2014),
who found first responders used websites most during Hurricane Sandy, followed by Facebook,
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Nixel, and Twitter. First responders also report never replying 10% more often than GOV
respondents, who report never responding to the public on the fourteen channels less than any
respondent group.

Figure 4.7. Communication Channel "Always" Supported by Respondent
Groups. Data Source: Survey Question 2.7. N=229.
News media organizations indicate the greatest use of websites, followed by Facebook,
and Twitter. News media preference to respond to questions and comments through websites
was apparent through overwhelming support of easily accessible contact web forms on their
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websites, making up more than half (54%) of the web forms in the study population. These
findings support shifting trends of how Americans prefer to retrieve their news. A 2016 Pew
Research Center survey found Americans access news via websites or web applications 36% of
the time, followed by 35% using SM to access news (Mitchell, Shearer, and Lu 2017). These
findings suggest news media organizations in our sample appear to prioritize communication
strategies similarly to public preferences.
In general, NGO respondents are most likely to always respond, and second least likely to
never respond to public questions and comments. The respondents from NGOs express the
greatest support of their top three communication channels (email, Facebook, website) through
the absence of never responses for the top three channels.
We also find NGOs are more likely to report always responding to public comments and
questions. Respondents suggest the most-supported SM channels rank from most to least reports
of always responding to the public using Facebook, at 45%, followed by 36% always responding
via Twitter, and 16% always responding via Instagram. Our findings suggest that EMs may
under-utilize the quickly growing audiences on SM, specifically Instagram. Besides its value as
a tool for targeting younger audiences, Instagram is the fastest-growing SM audience, currently
used by 35% of Americans (Pew Research Center 2018).
4.4. Chapter Four Summary of Findings
This chapter explored findings from the survey of agencies and organization in areas
affected by Hurricane Isaac and Sandy in 2012, contributing knowledge about SM usage by
members of the whole community of EM. Specifically, the research objective was to examine
five topics including the extent of SM use, the roles and potential benefits of SM, barriers to SM
use reported by non-users, the channels preferred by survey respondents, and reported levels of
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communication activity across the four phases of EM. While 9 in 10 respondents reported using
SM for risk and crisis communication, the remaining 10% of non-users most commonly report it
is not their organization’s mission to engage the community in risk and crisis communication.
All four respondent groups report the greatest level of SM use during the response phase,
and the least amount of activity during the mitigation phase. Respondents directed by NIMS –
by definition government groups – report the most activity on SM throughout the four phases of
an emergency. Both NEWS and NGO respondents reported the most activity during the
response phase followed by the recovery phase. These findings suggest public information
brokers (FR and GOV) are more likely to advise their audiences of hazards during the
preparedness phase. They also maintain a high level of SM communication through the
response phase. Respondents holding secondary roles in risk and crisis communication (NEWS
and NGO) report SM use during the response phase, but report being more active on SM during
the recovery phase. In other words, these findings suggest organizations holding primary and
secondary roles in EM may also play differential but complementary roles to in risk and crisis
communications with the public across the phases of EM cycle.
The most preferred SM channel for responding to questions from the public among
respondents is Facebook. Almost half (45%) of respondents report always responding to the
public via Facebook, followed by 36% always responding via Twitter, and 16% always
responding to Instagram communications. Survey findings indicated all respondent groups
except NGOs report always responding to the public through interactive websites. Facebook is
the top-supported SM channel by respondents and the public alike, but the findings indicate
misaligned support exists for other popular SM platforms with rapidly growing audiences such
as Instagram. This finding is consistent with Hughes and Palen (2012), who suggest the
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bureaucratic dimensions of the National Incident Management System creates inflexibility for
public information officers facing shifting information pathways, and is also a struggle expressed
by FEMA Director Craig Fugate, a proponent for the development of Next Generation 91110
systems capable of adapting to new technologies (Fugate 2011b).
Researchers agree the quiet times between emergencies present the most opportunity for
building relationship in the community to foster credibility and build public trust in risk and
crisis information providers. Greater institutional trust may lead community members to follow
the advice of public warning messages, thus reducing the amount of time spent milling for
information in personal networks when individuals face an unfamiliar risk to public health
(Hughes and Chauhan 2015, Janoke, Liu, and Sheppard 2012, Wood et al. 2017). The quiet time
between emergency events includes the mitigation phase in FEMA’s four-phase model of
emergency management, the phase of lowest reported use of SM by the survey respondents to
communicate with the public.
Other works suggest that building relationships with community members helps to
facilitate the development of social capital, which is an important factor contributing to resilience
to disasters (Aldrich and Meyer 2015). Respondents also suggest redundancy in number of
communication channels supported by risk and crisis communicators could help to narrow the
gap in citizen-government communication by reaching more individuals, which may be
problematic for organizations following the restrictive nature of NIMS protocol.
This chapter presented results from the first survey and identified key attitudes and
patterns of SM use by members of the whole community of EM. The following chapter
examines challenges and strategies to improve the effectiveness of SM use by the respondents.

10

https://www.911.gov/issue_nextgeneration911.html
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Chapter 5. Obstacles and Strategies to Reduce Disparity in Digital Disaster
Communication: Emerging Best Practices
The previous chapter presented survey results that shed light on how SM is being used by
the major groups of institutions that comprise the “whole community” of emergency
management. Research objective II examines the challenges respondents report facing when
using SM for risk and crisis communication, then explores tactics and strategies they employ to
overcome such challenges. Throughout this chapter, I refer to first responders and governmentrelated agencies and organizations combined as “GOV-C” and nongovernment organizations
combined with news media organizations as “NGO-C”. Dividing the survey respondents into
two groups helps to identify the potential influence of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) on some of the problems encountered in addition to the adaptive strategies implemented.
The results reported here provide new knowledge about how key organizations address the
various limitations and challenges of social media in their work with the public. This
information enables researchers to begin to identify emerging best practices to make SM more
effective in the field of emergency management.
5.1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents
The majority of responses used in this analysis came from the GOV-C group. Figure 5.1
illustrates the composition of survey responses per group in the center pie chart, and reported
geographic reach is shown in the smaller outer pie charts. While GOV-C populate only 45% of
the study population, the center pie chart indicates GOV-C respondents contributed nearly two in
three survey responses. This suggests respondents operating under the guidance of NIMS may
be more likely to engage the public on SM than NGO-Cs in the study area. The smaller outer
charts of Figure 5.1 show that most responses (78%) were contributed by local and county level
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organizations, with the majority of GOV-C responses submitted by local entities and majority of
NGO-Cs representing from county-level organizations.

Figure 5.1. NGO-C and GOV-C Respondents using Social Media for Risk and Crisis
Communication in full color Orange and Blue Respectively in the Center Pie, and the
Geographic Reach of Respondents per Group in the Outer Pies. Data Source: Survey
Questions 1.1, 1.2.
Research has indicated SM use may become easier over time as organizations gain
experience and apply lessons learned to address and overcome challenges (Mergel and
Bretschneider 2013). Researchers propose organizations using SM encounter three phases of
adoption, or levels of activity before SM becomes “institutionalized” or fully integrated into the
communication strategy of an organization. Therefore, the length of time respondents have
worked with SM tools may be related to some of the challenges they may report. To examine
this further, Figure 5.2 was constructed to illustrate the year respondents adopted Twitter on the
left axis versus new users of Twitter among the general public reported in millions on the right
axis. Here, we use the beginning year of Twitter use as a proxy for all SM use within the
organization. It is interesting to note that the peak year of new adoption of Twitter by members
of the general public occurred in 2012. Adoption of Twitter by NGO-Cs peaked two years after
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that of the public, and three years later among GOV-C respondents. This lag time may suggest
that aspects of NIMS may inhibit innovation in use of new SM platforms for EM communication
with the public. Figure 5.2 also suggests many of the survey respondents did not adopted Twitter
until after FEMA Director Craig Fugate’s public endorsement of Twitter as a tool to supplement
risk and crisis communication in 2011, and 2012 Atlantic Hurricane season that produced
Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy (Fugate 2011b).

Figure 5.2. Adoption of Twitter for Emergency Communication by Survey Respondents vs.
New Individual Twitter Users in the United States. Survey Question 4.24. New Users Data
Source: (Wolfe 2018)
5.2. Social Media Challenges
Research Question 2.1: Which key obstacles are most commonly reported by survey
respondents concerning the use of social media in risk and crisis communication?
Presenting the common obstacles reported by survey respondents contributes baseline
information regarding the emergence of new challenges and progress made towards known
major challenges of the use of SM. Better insights concerning the challenges to SM use by these
organizations may help the leadership to fine-tune support efforts to enhance emergency

63

communications through adoption of SM tools. Additionally, gathering feedback regarding
whether or not there is diminishing concern toward the specific challenges that were described as
significant impediments and challenges in past studies would provide important information as to
whether progress has been made toward the institutionalization of SM, as described by Mergel
and Bretschneider (2013).
5.2.1. Concern of Common Obstacles in the Literature
Respondents indicated their levels of concern toward common obstacles when reaching
out to disaster-affected communities in a Likert-type response matrix where 1 = not a concern, 2
= small concern, and 3 = major concern. Figure 5.3 illustrates mean Likert scores in descending
order, with the obstacle of greatest concern listed first. Respondent groups reported somewhat
similarly for the top three obstacles of concern with a greater level of concern reported by NGOCs. The most concerning obstacles include issues with the unknown accuracy of information on
SM, insufficient human resources to monitor SM, and anonymity of users. Troubles with
securing adequate human resources has been reported as a top concern in three similar studies
since 2012 listed in Appendix A (Su et al. 2013, Plotnick and Hiltz 2016, McCormick 2016).
These results also present the first instance of information accuracy being reported as the top
concern of EMs in the literature. This finding suggests survey respondents have greater concern
about external challenges, the types of problems commonly associated with more advanced
levels of SM use, after they have overcome internal-type challenges.
While mean Likert scores may be ideal for comparing reported of levels of concern
between groups visually, Figure 5.3 lacks detail regarding the variation of responses within each
group. Explicit response ratios presented in Figure 5.4 presents greater precision of response
necessary to gather which obstacles were most often reported as not a concern.
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Figure 5.3. Concern Toward Common Obstacles. Data Source: Survey Question 3.18. N=196.
The obstacle of least concern for GOV-C respondents was lacking procedure or protocol
within agency/organization for the use of SM, followed by insufficient technology resources and
the anonymity of users. These findings may indicate growing support from leadership and
investment in SM communication in recent years. Additionally, relatively minor concern over
the anonymity of user may be a result of GOV-type organizations typically using SM for
information dissemination as found by McCormick (2016).
The least concerning obstacles reported by NGO-Cs varied from GOV-Cs, with
improper/insufficient training, difficulty or complexity of SM, and low subscription to SM by
public in the local area of least concern respectively. This finding is likely due to the differences
in the organizational structures in respondent groups, with GOV-Cs following the guidance of
the NIMS under the National Response Framework. Reporting little concern towards these
components of familiarity with SM tools may also be an indication of experience with SM as
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organizations move towards more advanced levels of SM adoption, or institutionalization of SM
tools.

Figure 5.4. Obstacles of Least Concern. Data Source: Survey Question 3.18. N=196.
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5.2.2. Other Obstacles
Survey respondents provided qualitative feedback regarding other obstacles when
reaching out to a disaster-affected community that were not mentioned previously to help
develop a comprehensive understanding and to detect the emergence of new challenges of SM
communication in the EM field. Text responses to open-ended questions coded into ten common
themes are listed in Table 5.1. These responses reveal GOV-Cs report a greater variety of
challenges than NGO-Cs. The most reported obstacle by both respondent groups relates to an
inability to access internet channels, coded as infrastructure failure/connectivity issues.
Accessing internet-based communications may be difficult following a catastrophic disaster, and
could present barriers to maintaining operable communications. When Ohio Senator Sherrod
Brown questioned FEMA Director Fugate regarding FEMA’s efforts to provide public support
for mobile communication in stricken areas in 2011, Fugate insisted “I have been pushing for a
long time,” mentioning Verizon was leading efforts to make charging stations available to
disaster-affected communities (Fugate 2011b). Since then, mobile providers have made strides
toward robust, disaster-proof networks. Although every disaster presents unique challenges that
require case-to-case investigation, reports from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
record propose connectivity may be improving in the wake of a natural disaster. For example,
when Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy made landfall in 2012, about one-quarter of cell sites went
down (News 2012), but five years later in the wake of Hurricane Harvey only 4% of cell sites
went offline (FCC 2017a, b, c, d, e, f). The memory of a crippled network may still be fresh in
the minds of EMs affected by Sandy, but major network providers including AT&T and Verizon
have stepped up to the challenge since 2012, preparing for Hurricane Harvey in 2017 (discussed
in the following chapter). Both network providers reported engaging in preparedness activities
before Harvey made landfall, including topping fuel for back-up generators, pre-positioning
67

mobile communication and command center assets, and rapidly inspecting damage with the aid
of drones (ATT News Team 2017, Verizon 2017). Therefore, as the communication trends of
the US public continue to shift toward greater reliance on mobile communications, network
providers answer with robust and redundant solutions.
Table 5.1. Common Themes of Other Challenges Not Listed. Data
Source: Survey Question 3.19. N=185.

The most-reported challenge described in text responses relates to the second top
suggestion for improving disaster resilience with SM reported in the previous chapter coded as
user friendliness and limited utility for organizational use. Difficulties with the design and
operation of SM have been reported in the literature since 2015 when Wukich and Mergel
described the information asymmetries and uneven sharing resulting from SM algorithms.
Another study found public agencies operating under the guidance of NIMS face challenges
related to the user-friendliness of SM in terms of account access and management, policies
guiding operation, data management, privacy and security, and accessibility access security
(Plotnick and Hiltz 2016).
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The third top obstacle respondents described was language and cultural barriers, an
obstacle not reported previously the literature. This obstacle may only be realized through
experience with SM and difficulties collecting information and interacting with the public.
Respondents also described challenges similar to the pre-determined response options discussed
previously, including rumor control and information accuracy, insufficient human resources,
and reaching elderly and low-income residents, with the latter two reported only by GOV-Cs.
Other challenges unique to GOV-Cs include scamming and phishing and intra-agency
coordination. In addition, 11% of GOV-Cs reported having no obstacles. Lastly, one field
unique to NGO-Cs was the challenge of practicing courtesy and respect for victims. Appendix
G includes a full record of original text responses.
5.3. Campaign Evaluation and Awareness
Research Question 2.2.: To what extent are survey respondents attempting to evaluate
the effectiveness of their online communications?
Observing audience behaviors provides users with metrics to determine how successful
their communication strategies have been at reaching SM goals (Davis 2012). Next, we explore
how respondents evaluate SM campaigns to contribute knowledge concerning the prevalence of
proactive efforts working toward overcoming communication challenges to achieve EM goals
such as enhancing risk and crisis communication with SM and expanding the reach of
communication within communities. Respondents provided feedback regarding audience
behaviors of interest and the modes of campaign evaluation.
The scholarly literature and guiding materials provided by the federal government agree
the whole community of EM may gain the greatest benefits from the adoption of SM tools when
they network and form relationships with community members during the quiet periods between
disasters. Participating in public outreach and maintaining listenability between disasters may
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help to build organizational credibility and develop trust within the community. It may also help
to extend the reach of critical messages, which in turn, may help to narrow communication gaps
and information asymmetries contributing to disparity in the receipt of risk and crisis
communications.
5.3.1. Audience Behaviors of Interest
Respondents indicated their relevant audience behaviors of interest by examining five
common behaviors proposed by Davis (2012) and through text responses to open-ended
questions. While the individual response options selected by respondents may contribute the
most commonly observed audience behaviors, we also explore an alternative method for gauging
levels of involvement in SM campaign evaluation by gathering how many behaviors respondents
report observing. We assume reporting observation of more audience behaviors may indicate a
greater level of involvement with campaign evaluation.
On average, GOV-Cs reported observing 2.6 of six possible audience behaviors, while
NGO-Cs selected 3.4. Figure 5.5 illustrates audience-behavior counts, including 8% of
respondents reporting observing no audience behavior to about one in five (21%) respondents
reporting observing either three and five audience behaviors. While GOV-C respondents report
greatest likelihood of observing up to three audience behaviors, over half (56%) of NGO-C
respondents report observing five audience behaviors. These findings suggest NGO-Cs may be
more observant of their audiences, and potentially more interested in how their audiences interact
with their SM.
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Figure 5.5. Audience Behaviors Observed on Social Media. Data Source: Survey
Question 3.16. N=207.
Next, we explore the specific audience behaviors respondents observe. Figure 5.6
illustrates these findings summarizing audience behaviors of interest sorted by combined
selection ratios. GOV-C respondents report greater interest in observing audience awareness of
(their) organization (26%) and public online engagement with (their) organization (25%). A
focus on measuring public awareness and engagement suggests GOV-C respondents have a
desire to understand the reach of their messages and how their audiences interact with them. By
contrast, one in ten GOV-Cs report not observing any audience behaviors; a rate double that of
NGO-C respondents.
NGO-C respondents reported greatest interest in clicks and shares (23%) measuring
traffic through SM pages to webpages, apps, and linked content. The second greatest audience
behavior of interest is online engagement (22%). NGO-Cs reported greater interest than GOVCs pertaining to three audience behaviors, including clicks and shares, new advocates and fans,
and increasing (their) organization’s online presence relative to other organizations.
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Figure 5.6. Online Audience Behaviors Measured by Survey Respondents. Data Source:
Survey Question 3.16. N=207.
5.3.2. Social Media Campaign Evaluation Metrics
Gathering which campaign evaluation metrics and growth strategies respondents
incorporate into SM efforts contributes insight regarding how organizations may be seeking to
overcome various challenges. For example, organizations proactively working to expand the
reach and effectiveness of their messages may be more likely to narrow information gaps and
communication disparity among their constituents than those using SM more passively. Greater
involvement with SM evaluation also may indicate progression through the three phases of SM
adoption as described by Mergel and Bretschneider (2014). Figure 5.7 shows that one in four
respondents observe two of the five pre-determined evaluation metrics. While GOV-C
respondents are most likely to observe or use two measures, NGO-Cs report most likely to utilize
three methods to evaluate the success of their campaign.
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Figure 5.7. Social Media Evaluation Metrics Counts. Data Source: Survey Question 3.17.
N=201.
To gain a better understanding of specifically which strategies are most commonly
utilized among respondent groups, Figure 5.8 illustrates the findings ascending by selection
choice. Overall the most commonly reported technique is to monitor social media metrics with
built-in features, observed by a slightly greater percent of NGO-C respondents. The second, and
only response choice selected more by GOV-Cs than NGO-Cs was to gather feedback from
public. In all other response options, NGO-Cs reported greater utilization. Lesser-utilized
evaluation and growth strategies include using data collected from metrics to expand reach of
messages and advertising or cross-referencing social media profile elsewhere. The least-utilized
evaluation strategy is consultation with third party organizations. These findings suggest
respondents are most likely to utilize simple and low-cost evaluation and growth strategies.
Overall, 13% of respondents reported utilizing no evaluation metrics or growth strategies, with
GOV-Cs more than three times more likely to forego SM evaluation than NGO-Cs.
Additionally, these findings indicate NGO-Cs are more likely to engage in campaign evaluation
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activities, and are more likely to employ more campaign evaluation metrics and growth
strategies, suggesting NGO-Cs could exhibit more advanced use of SM in Mergel and
Bretschneider’s (2014) three-stage SM adoption process.

Figure 5.8. Social Media Campaign Evaluation Metrics and Growth Strategies Observed by
Survey Respondents. Data Source: Survey Question 3.17. N=201.
5.4. Overcoming Obstacles with Social Media Communication Best Practices
Research Question 2.3: Which tactics and strategies do survey respondents report
employing to overcome the obstacles they encounter in their use of social media for
risk and crisis communication?
This section explores the application of some best-practice techniques for communicating
through SM by discussing specific policies, procedures, strategies, and tactics used to enhance
risk and crisis communications. First, survey respondents indicate advancement in the adoption
SM communication strategies by reporting adoption of policies for SM use within their
organization since 2012. Next, respondents report involvement with specific progressions,
including developing target goals and a plan guiding SM use, incorporation of bi-directional
communication strategies, employing dedicated staff, and maintaining continuous SM
“listenability”. Policy adoption and campaign developments provide evidence of progression
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along the three-phase process for SM use for maximizing the benefits of SM (Mergel and
Bretschneider 2013). Then, we present findings regarding efforts for information validation (or
accuracy verification) before sharing, followed by reports of specific methods used to validate
information. Verifying the accuracy of information observed on SM before sharing is necessary
to mitigate the risk of passing on inaccurate information. Next, survey respondents provide
feedback regarding their efforts to leverage resources and staff to meet surges in communication
demands during emergencies. We seek to understand how respondents engage audiences in
terms of specific message types indicating involvement with push, pull, and networking tactics.
Finally, respondents indicate their policies for “following” other users on SM, an activity that
may extend the reach of their organization’s communications and their capacity to collect
information from SM.
5.4.1. Development of Social Media Policies
Since 2012, 62% of GOV-C respondents report adopting policies to improve their SM
communications, while near equal portions of GOV-C respondents report they are unsure or have
not adopted new policies. NGO-C respondents report less policy development, with 31%
indicating no change and only 56% acknowledging policy under development. Greater policy
development among GOV-C respondents is likely due to the demands of centralized institutional
guidance, such as NIMS, requiring public information brokers to advance SM communication
strategies. Table 5.2 lists reported adoption of several specific policies aimed to overcome
challenges of SM communication, with slightly greater growth reported among GOV-Cs in all
but one category concerning employing dedicated SM personnel. Overall, the most-reported
policy advancement of SM campaigns (for 34% of GOV-Cs and 33% of NGO-Cs) has been an
effort to provide more rapid response to public comments and concerns. Fewer respondents,
about two in ten from each group indicated developing target goals and a specific comment75

response plan for their SM use. About one in ten respondents of each group report monitoring
SM every day around the clock.
Table 5.2. Social Media Policy Adoption Since 2012. Data Source: Survey Question 4.27.
N=93.

5.4.2. Addressing Information Accuracy on Social Media
Respondents previously reported the accuracy of information on SM is of major concern
when interacting with the public. Developing protocol to validate, or verify the accuracy of
information on SM before sharing it with the public helps to lessen the unintended circulation of
misinformation. Figure 5.9 suggests nearly nine in ten GOV-C respondents always verify the
accuracy of information before sharing. Unfortunately, NGO-C respondents may be more

Figure 5.9. Verifying Information Accuracy Before Sharing. Data Source: Survey Question
2.9. N=227.
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susceptible to spreading misinformation on SM, with only three-quarters of respondents always
verifying information accuracy and even 1% never engaging in the behavior.
A follow-up question sought to understand the methods employed to verify the accuracy
of information on SM. Figure 5.10 illustrates the selection ratios from respondent groups for the
four pre-determined methods of information verification. The most common method reported by
both groups is sharing information only from official sources, selected by 52% of GOV-Cs and
45% of NGO-Cs. This method helps to prevent spreading misinformation on SM. About 4% of
survey respondents from each group even reported having no policy regarding information
sharing on social media, which may potentially provide opportunity for the spread of
misinformation within network. These less favorable information sharing criteria include first
person accounts from persons on the ground, selected by 28% of GOV-Cs and 31% of NGO-Cs,
and sharing information only from Verified Accounts (Twitter), selected by 16% of GOV-Cs and
21% of NGO-Cs.

Figure 5.10. Methods to Verify Social Media Information Accuracy. Data Source: Survey
Question 2.10. N=221.
5.4.3. Planning to Meet Informational Needs on Social Media during Emergencies
Another practice aimed to enhance the effectiveness of communications is to provide
additional support to address surges in public-information requests. In addition to enacting
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mandatory recalls of personnel to bring full organizational communication capacities during a
crisis, responders can benefit from maintaining online engagement with response partners,
community organizations, and volunteer groups before and during a crisis to extend
communication capacities when resources are stretched (DHS 2014c). Figure 5.11 indicates both
respondent groups report similar capacities to enhance communications during a crisis, with
GOV-C respondents reporting slightly greater robustness (64% versus NGO-Cs reporting 58%)
in abilities to leverage additional communication support. While one in five GOV-Cs report not
having a plan to leverage additional support to monitor SM during an emergency, over one
quarter of NGO-Cs (26%) report the same.

Figure 5.11. Leveraging Additional Support for Social Media During Emergencies.
Data Source: Survey Question 2.12. N=223
Survey respondents indicate the most common method to enhance social media
communication capacites is to divert resources from with their organization. Figure 5.12 shows
about half of GOV-Cs and 44% of NGO-Cs have plans to enhance communication capacities
with internal resources. The second most common method for 21% of GOV-Cs to enhance
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communications is to leverage third party organizations. Slightly more NGO-Cs (23%) report
planning to leverage volunteers during an emergency.

Figure 5.12. Methods to Enhance Communication Capacities During a Crisis. Data Source:
Survey Question 2.13. N=133.
5.4.4. Outreach and Community Engagement
Outreach and community engagement findings relate to expanding the reach of
communications, types of messages shared with the public, and whether respondents “follow”
other users on SM. Agencies and organizations of the whole community of EM share various
types of messages and at various phases of EM. For example, crisis communication involved
push alerts in preparedness or response phases, while risk communication is typically less
urgent, and may seek to educate or to pull information from audiences. Risk communication
may occur during each phase of the EM cycle. Mergel (2014) discussed best practices for the
use of SM by GOV-Cs during a crisis, and the values of sharing various types of messages
including traditional one-to-many approaches to push information to the masses, one-to-one
approaches to pull information by engaging individuals, and many-to-many networking tactics in
which officials become part of the online community and conversation (Mergel 2014). Figure
5.13 suggests NGO-Cs may help to “fill the gap” in risk and crisis communication by outpacing
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GOV-Cs in two of the seven listed message types. GOV-Cs report greater involvement with push
tactics than NGO-Cs, sending more local updates, alerts, or warnings and responses to media
organizations. NGO-C respondent send more messages in one category of push messages,
including retrospective or after-action reports. This finding is consistent with the literature
suggesting GOV-Cs primarily use SM to broadcast public information, but also suggests NGOCs may help to supplement push communication after the fact. Respondent groups report
sharing "send us your pictures" or "Let us know" pull-type messages similar, though GOV-Cs
report sharing call to action message more often, seeking audience participation in activities such
as clicking a link to read more. Reported activity related to networking tactics are split, with
GOV-Cs reporting sharing more interactive community engagement and networking messages
such as replying to individual users, acting as a part of the community, and NGO-Cs report
retweeting citizens’ messages more often.

Figure 5.13. Types of Messages Shared over Social Media. Data Source: Survey Question
2.8. N=228
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When collecting information from SM, a larger network may not always yield the most
valuable publicly-sourced information. On the contrary, choosing not to follow community
members may limit public agencies and organizations abilities to generate adequate situational
awareness. Figure 5.14 suggests GOV-C respondents may be more likely to follow reputable
sources of crisis and risk information while NGO-Cs may possess greater access to local
networks by following SM users in the local area. Three times the number of GOV-C
respondents report following SM users is not the focus of their campaign.

Figure 5.14. Protocol for Following Social Media Users. Data Source: Survey Question 3.15.
N=206.
5.5. Chapter Five Summary of Findings
The second research objective aimed to examine the challenges faced by survey
respondents, whether these issues are similar to those reported in earlier research, and how
respondents address the problems they encounter. We focused on potential difference among
survey respondents operating under the guidance of federal government EM practices and
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guidelines, such as NIMS, and those that are not subject to these guidelines. Therefore, we
compared first responders and government-related agencies, referred to as GOV-C, to news
media organizations and non-government organizations, referred to as NGO-C.
Respondents indicated their level of concern toward obstacles commonly reported in the
literature when communicating with the public using SM. Both respondent groups were most
concerned about the accuracy of information they encounter when communicating with the
public. The second most concerning challenge reported by respondents was obtaining adequate
human resources to monitor SM. Both top concerns of survey respondents are consistent with
the findings of related studies (Plotnick and Hiltz 2016, Wukich and Mergel 2015). We found
the least concerning common obstacle reported by GOV-Cs to be the lack of specific procedure
or protocol for the use of SM. The common obstacle of least concern for NGO-C respondents
was the lack of SM training. Both common challenges of least concern were reported as major
concerns in other recent studies, suggesting concern about earlier identified, specific challenges
in the EM field may be shifting as public agencies and organizations gain experience with SM.
Respondents also provided text responses concerning other SM challenges they are facing. Both
respondent groups perceive the greatest challenge when reaching out to a disaster-affected
community is the stability of the technical network infrastructure and issues with connectivity,
followed with difficulties related to the user-friendliness and accessibility of information on SM
for emergency managers during a crisis. Both of these other reported obstacles are new to the
literature and appear to suggest survey respondents have concern for challenges and obstacles
that are external to their operations.
The remainder of the chapter explored how survey respondents report addressing
common challenges of SM communication. In terms of audience behaviors of interest, the

82

survey results found GOV-Cs are most interested in determining the level of public awareness of
their organizations, followed by online engagement with their organization, which was the top
interest of NGO-Cs, tied with clicks and shares to websites and mobile applications. Both
respondent groups most commonly evaluate the success of their SM campaigns through
observation of built-in SM metrics and features. The second most common evaluation strategy
of GOV-Cs was gathering feedback from the public, while NGO-Cs reported using data
collected from metrics to expand the reach of their messages. In terms of policies adopted since
2012, both respondent groups aim for more rapid response to public comments and concerns.
The second most common policy adoption for both groups since 2012 is employing dedicated
SM personnel within their organization.
Survey results found GOV-Cs are more likely to verify the accuracy of information
before sharing on SM, and that only 1% report never verifying the accuracy of SM information
before sharing. Related results include that when following other users, GOV-Cs report only
following reputable and verified information sources on SM at a greater rate than NGO-Cs. In
terms of following users in the local area, NGO-Cs are more likely to do so. While GOV-Cs are
most likely to plan to leverage additional support to monitor SM during an emergency, both
respondent groups are most likely to divert resources from within their organization to meet
surges in public information requests. The second most common method reported by GOV-Cs
to meet demand surges is leveraging third-party organizations, while NGO-Cs report ad-hoc
leveraging of volunteers. Lastly, the most common types of messages shared by GOV-Cs are
responses to media organizations, while NGO-Cs report greatest sharing of retrospective or afteraction reports.
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As organizations move toward the institutionalization of SM as described by Mergel and
Bretschneider (2013), they develop policies and allocate resources to support their SM campaign
objectives. The experiences and lessons learned as SM is used more widely in emergency
management help to make challenges of SM communication more predictable and more likely
for EMs to overcome. Through this process of SM campaign development, the challenges that
are internal to the organizations may be reduced or mitigated. The survey findings indicate both
GOV-Cs and NGO-Cs report greater concern toward external-type challenges, with NGO-Cs
reporting more concerned with external-type challenges. When asked about any other challenges
of social media communication in an open-ended question, only 13% of the responses described
internal-type challenges. Additionally, the findings suggest the guidance offered by NIMS has
been successful in helping governmental organizations and agencies address common obstacles
associated with SM use during and after emergencies. These results indicate that the SM
campaigns of respondents generally have matured into the “institutionalization” of SM as both
groups report less concern toward internal-type challenges such as human resources and SM
competence.
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Chapter 6. Case Study: The Role of Social Media Among Hurricane Harvey
Responders
6.1. Introduction to Case Study: Hurricane Harvey and Social Media
The first two research components identified patterns of social media (SM) use and
strategies to improve its utility for risk and crisis communication across the four phases of
emergency management (EM). This chapter shifts focus to investigate the use of social media
(SM) during the response phase of a large-scale crisis on the Texas Gulf Coast, when Hurricane
Harvey caused widespread flooding in the Greater Houston area in 2017. This case study is
based on original survey findings from a survey of first responders (FR), government-related
agencies and offices (GOV), and a combination of non-governmental organizations , including
news media, faith-based and other charitable organizations (NGO-C) who used SM to either
conduct or support rescue and response efforts following landfall of Hurricane Harvey. Survey
respondents reported on the objectives or purposes for their SM use and the specific SM
channels or platforms they preferred. In addition, respondents offered insight regarding their
organizational resources used to monitor Twitter, and how they handled the information they
received through SM. Survey respondents also shared their thoughts on potential lessons learned
from the use of SM, including the overall usefulness of SM for assisting rescue efforts, and how
Twitter and other ITC could be improved for better risk and crisis communication during future
urban-scale disasters.
Despite the growing support for risk and crisis communication enhancement and
diversification of methods by agency leaders and employees within the EM community,
responders continue to struggle to convey timely, useful information to the public about
hazardous conditions and may miss opportunities to receive valuable citizen feedback (Wukich
and Mergel 2015). Hurricane Harvey illuminated the limitations of antiquated 911 systems still
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used in Houston and much of the country in 2017. At the peak of the emergency, Harris County,
Texas public safety answering points (PSAP), more commonly known as emergency dispatch
centers, received about 80,000 calls within 24 hours (Kelly 2017). Dispatchers worked around
the clock to respond and clear the calls, as wait times for high-water rescues increased from an
average of 3.5 hours on August 26, to over 20 hours the following day (Harden 2018). The 911
call log shows one Houston resident who was rescued by a civilian in a tractor trailer would have
waited almost three days before first responders would have arrived at her address (Harden
2018). While the Houston 911 system featured support for short message service (SMS) or text
messaging, it still relied on the legacy wired phone network. These wired networks cannot
support advanced features such as rerouting calls to neighboring PSAPs, rich-text processing,
and improved information accuracy, of enhanced web-based dispatch systems such as Next
Generation 911 systems (FEMA 2017a).
As stated above, the objective of this case study is to develop a clearer understanding of
how SM was used to support response and rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey. We propose
thee main research questions to examine how FRs, GOVs, and NGO-Cs worked together to
coordinate and execute rescue missions with the aid of SM following the landfall of Hurricane
Harvey in the Greater Houston area.
6.1.1. Research Questions
Research Question 3.1: How did survey respondents utilize social media to assist
response and rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey?
Research Question 3.2: How did survey respondents address commonly reported
obstacles concerning the use of social media during disasters?
Research Question 3.3: Which recommendations do responders suggest could
improve the utility of social media in future emergencies?
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6.1.2. Hurricane Harvey
Hurricane Harvey made landfall three times in August 2017, passing over the Yucatan
Peninsula, then coastal Texas, and making a final landfall in western Louisiana, moving quickly
northward as it deteriorated. Harvey was the first “major hurricane” to hit the Texas coast since
Hurricane Brett in 1999, a designation given to storms making landfall with a Saffir-Simpson
intensity rating of category three and greater (NWS 2018).
The following discussion regarding Hurricane Harvey and the research study area refers
to Figure 6.1. The map includes Harvey’s track and intensity labeled in Saffir-Simpson
categories downloaded from the National Hurricane Center11. Accompanying timestamps show
the location of the center of the system at midnight local time (Central Daylight Time). Figure
6.1 also illustrates areas enduring immense property damage sourced from the FEMA Damage
Assessment model12 and released two days following Harvey’s northward departure from the
map frame across Louisiana. Grey hatching and labels over Texas Counties indicate counties
where at least one Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) experienced disruptions between
August 26 -31, as reported in daily FCC Communication Status Reports. Figure 6.1 also
illustrates a map of east Texas and the research study area used to preform study population
sampling, including the State of Texas, nine counties forming the Houston metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA), and the City of Houston. The reference map includes locations of
surface water bodies, city boundaries, and major roads over the Texas County boundaries
collected from the TNRIS data catalog13 and TxDOT Open Data Portal14.

11

https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
https://data.femadata.com/NationalDisasters/HurricaneHarvey/Data/DamageAssessments/
13
https://www.tnris.org/data-catalog/
14
http://gis-txdot.opendata.arcgis.com/
12
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Figure 6.1. Study area Hurricane Harvey Track and Intensity, Public Safety Answering Point
Counties Outages, and Modeled Damage.
Hurricane Harvey Development and Progression
Hurricane Harvey emerged as a tropical wave off the coast of Africa on August 13, 2017.
The system and was named Tropical Cyclone Nine of the 2017 Atlantic season on the morning
of August 17 and upgraded to a tropical storm (TS) that afternoon. Harvey impacted the
Windward Islands August 18 and entered the Caribbean Sea, where it weakened to a tropical
wave and passed northward over the Yucatan Peninsula the morning of August 22. Upon reentry into the warm Gulf waters, the system rapidly intensified, tracking northwest towards the
Texas coast, where Texas authorities issued three extreme wind warnings. Hurricane Harvey
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battered the Texas Gulf coast with winds up to 132 miles per hour and storm surge as high as 12
feet. Harvey crept inland, dumping enormous amounts of rain before re-entering the Gulf once
again. Before the event was over, areas of southeast Texas received close to 60 inches of rain.
Appendix H includes a timeline of the storm evolution, impacts on Texas, and detailed reported
communication concerns associated with rescue and response efforts.
Hurricane Harvey Aftermath
Hurricane Harvey claimed 88 lives, with 82 in the Houston area (Moravec 2017). FEMA
reports local, state, and federal responders rescued 122,331 people and 5,234 pets with the help
of over 31,000 deployed National Guards (FEMA 2017c). The catastrophic event resulted in a
cost of $125 billion, double that of Hurricane Sandy (NOAA 2018). Harvey was the most
significant rainfall event on US record, with totals exceeding 60 inches over eight days in
southeast Texas (USGS n.d.). About one-third (43%) of greater Houston streamflow sensors
detected peak stages exceeding local ground elevations, with the greatest calculated flood depth
of 14.2 feet above ground level in the 6 PM hour of August 30 at the Trinity River, Northeast of
Beaumont, Texas (USGS n.d.).
FEMA estimates that 98% of damaged properties are located within Texas, and over twothirds (67%) of modeled Texas damage exists within Greater Houston with an average
inundation depth of three feet (FEMA 2017b). One retrospective report estimates over 204,000
home and apartment buildings were damaged in Harris County alone (Hunn et al. 2018).
6.1.3. Hurricane Harvey and Communication Networks
Hurricane Harvey was described as a “viral storm” (Scalf 2017), in which individual
citizens converged in mass on SM as digital volunteers with hopes of connecting victims with
responders by combing SM for requests for rescue. These SM communication efforts extended
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the potential of the whole community in contributing to response efforts when 911 systems
became overwhelmed.
Hurricane Harvey highlighted deficiencies in PSAPs when a total of 30 PSAPs
experienced disruption in 20 Texas Counties and one Louisiana Parish between August 26 and
August 31. In all, Harvey contributed 73 station-day disruptions in the six days, averaging over
12 disruptions per day (FCC 2017b, c, d, e, f, a). While Nueces County, Texas experienced the
greatest number of station-day disruptions (Port Aransas PD all six days and Robstown PD three
days), San Patricio County had the most disrupted PSAPs with three points of contact
experiencing seven station-day disruptions, including Portland PD, Mathis PD, and Ingleside PD.
In all, affected counties and one Parish experienced two station days without re-route, one
station-day without Automatic Location Identification (ALI), 13 station-days in which calls were
re-routed with ALI, and 16 station days in which calls were re-routed without ALI.
By contrast, cellular (cell) networks proved more reliable most of the affected areas. The
slow-moving nature of Harvey allowed network providers like AT&T and Verizon to prepare for
the damaging effects by taking part in activities such as filling generator tanks and staging
resources before Harvey’s landfall (ATT News Team 2017, Verizon 2017). Figure 6.2 illustrates
cell site outages, indicating the percent of operation cellular signal broadcasting stations in
counties also experiencing PSAP disruptions. Clustered lines near the top of Figure 6.2 indicates
many cell sites remained operation in the days following Harvey’s landfall in South Texas,
suggesting the cellular networks provided critical redundancy to communication networks
despite disruption of PSAPs, which allowed disaster victims to utilize the robust mobile signal to
communicate and receive information. Cell service in counties experiencing PSAP disruptions
are listed as of the percent of operational cell sites per county per parish per day, where counties
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are ranked on the right axis from least to most average outages, including Cameron (LA),
Cameron (TX), and Kleberg, which remained 100% operational through the observed timeframe.

Figure 6.2. Percent of Operational Cell Sites in Counties with PSAP Disruption
Daily cell site outages averaged less than 18% within the PSAP-disrupted counties and
parish between August 26 and August 31 (FCC 2017a, b, c, d, e, f). Cell site disruptions were
greatest in Aransas County, Texas, where the greatest wind velocities of Hurricane Harvey were
reported. Winds as great as 132 miles per hour reported near Port Aransas (NWS 2018) brought
all but one of the 19 cell sites offline for August 26 and 27 (FCC 2017a, b).
Robust performance of the cell network may suggest the incorporation of mobile-enabled
communication platforms such as SM could help responders extend the reach of communications
and public assistance when primary channels (PSAPs) become inoperable.
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6.2. Characteristics of Survey Respondents
The results present original survey findings based on the analysis of SM use among three
stakeholder groups contributing to the whole community of EM during Hurricane Harvey in
2017. These are first responders (FR), government-related agencies and offices (GOV), and nongovernmental organizations combined (NGO-C). While survey distribution efforts yielded 90
responses, 26 were omitted from analysis due to problems including low completion rates and
unclassifiable responses. Figure 6.3 illustrates the composition of the 64 survey responses per
respondent group (left) and geographic reach or jurisdiction (right).

Figure 6.3. Survey Respondent Profile by Organization Type (Left) and
Geographic Reach (Right). Data Source: Survey Question 1.
While FRs populated fewer than one-quarter (22%) of the entire study population, they
expressed the greatest response rates, contributing over half (53%) of the survey responses. The
majority are fire departments, followed by law enforcement agencies, emergency medical
services, and search and rescue associations. Almost three in four (74%) FRs represent local
agencies, with the remaining quarter split between county and state-level jurisdictions.
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Nearly one in three (28%) survey responses were contributed by GOVs. Almost half
(47%) of the respondents from the GOVs group operate SM for municipal communication
offices. About one-fifth (21%) of GOVs represent emergency management agencies and several
correspond to public health offices; all of which operate between local and state levels of
organization. Lastly, one GOV respondent represents a national-level fact-finding public
research agency.
Non-government respondents include local chambers of commerce, sub-state level news
media organizations, local and national charitable organizations, and faith-based organizations
with national reach. Over half (58%) of NGO-C respondents represent organizations with local
and county-level reach within Houston MSA. While these supporting organizations populated
nearly half (44%) of the study population, they exhibit the lowest response rates relative to FR
and GOV respondents.
Nearly nine in ten (89%) of survey respondents report having a SM account. The high
rate of SM adoption is comparable to findings in previous research components. All respondents
reporting non-use of SM belong to the FR group, primarily at the local level, in which one in five
(21%) report only using radio and 911 dispatch to communicate with the public. These finding
are similar to a recent study where researchers found about a quarter of EM agencies actually
prohibited the use of SM (Plotnick and Hiltz 2016).
More than four in five (83%) survey respondents report being directly involved with
emergency rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey, including 100% of FRs, 78% of GOVs, and
42% of NGO-Cs. The 17% of survey respondents who were not directly involved in rescues
filled secondary roles in the response effort, such as monitoring SM sharing pertinent
information with rescuers. The findings in the following sections contribute knowledge from
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experience and lessons learned by the responders both directly and indirectly involved with
emergency rescues, contributing to a portrait of the whole community of EM responding to
Hurricane Harvey.
6.3. Social Media Used to Assist Response and Rescue Efforts
Research Question 3.1: How did survey respondents utilize social media to assist
response and rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey?
About four in five (81%) survey respondents used the web to assist rescue operations
during Hurricane Harvey, including 93% of FRs, 83% of GOVs, and half of NGO-C
respondents. Nearly all (95%) of survey respondents who used the web also used SM. First
responders most commonly reported (16%) accessing the internet without using SM, followed by
(7%) of GOVs who used ITCs excluding SM. All NGO-Cs using the web to assist rescue efforts
also used SM, while NGO-Cs (33%) were the only group reporting using SM to assist rescue
efforts without using other aspects of the web. Given 89% of respondents reported having a SM
account, these findings indicate some respondents with SM accounts did not use SM during
Hurricane Harvey.
6.3.1. Preferred Social Media Tools
Respondents indicated their level of use concerning twelve communication channels,
including eight SM platforms in a five-option Likert-type response matrix identical to that used
in the first survey of EM organizations in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy. Figure
6.4 indicates the most common unofficial communication channel utilized during Hurricane
Harvey was Facebook, used by nine in ten FRs and all respondents representing GOVs and
NGO-Cs. The second most-used channel was websites, followed by emails. The second most
common SM platform used during Harvey was Twitter, favored by (94% of) GOVs.
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In terms of frequency of use, survey respondents reported utilizing Facebook more than
any other SM platform. While the second overall most-used channel was websites, the second
most-preferred platform among FRs is email, Twitter by GOVs, and websites by NGO-Cs. The
top six channels preferred by survey respondents are consistent with the preferences reported by
survey respondents in areas affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy.

Figure 6.4. Alternative or Unofficial Channels used to Communicate with the public During
Hurricane Harvey. Data Source: Survey Question 6. N=48.
Adopting multiple communication channels allows risk and crisis communicators to
reach broader audiences, potentially extending the reach of communications. Over one-third
(36%) of GOVs report utilizing three SM channels, followed by 29% supporting two channels.
By contrast, over one-third (36%) of FRs reported using only one SM channel during Harvey
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rescue efforts, followed by 29% reporting that they used two channels. One-third (33%) of
NGO-Cs report using only one channel while another third reports using two.
Nearly nine in ten (89%) of respondents reported receiving requests for rescue assistance.
Survey respondents reported receiving requests on an average of 2.2 channels, and on as many as
five channels or platforms. GOV respondents reported receiving requests on the most channels,
who received rescue requests on an average 2.4 among those who reported receiving any
requests, followed by an average 2.2 channels by NGO-Cs, and 2.1 channels by FRs. The
difference in channels responders received requests through is likely closely related to the
number of channels they accessed. Most respondents reported receiving recue requests on
Facebook, followed by phone and radio, email, Twitter, websites, word-of-mouth, then Zello.
Table 6.1 lists how each respondent group received requests, sorted by selection ratio (frequency
a response option was selected by all respondents) listed in the last column.
Table 6.1. Percent of Respondents from each Respondent
Group who Received Rescue Requests through Popular
Unofficial Channels Respondents. Data Source: Survey
Question 14. N=37.

96

While each group reported receiving requests via Facebook more than any other channel,
the second-top channel through which requests from the public were communicated differed for
the three groups. Phone and radio were the second-top channel through which FRs received
rescue request. Twitter was the second top channel for requests among GOVs, and NGO-Cs
reported email was second most common channel for which they received rescue requests.
Other FRs reported being unable to dispatch responders without receiving the request via
PSAP 911 dispatch. This finding suggests that some responders may observe requests for help
on their SM accounts but are unable to convert a web-based message to an actionable dispatch of
assisting personnel. One NGO-C respondent mentioned receiving a Google spreadsheet
containing a database of people in need of assistance compiled by individuals searching social
media.

We received rescue requests via Facebook Messenger (and email) but are only equipped
to dispatch emergency requests via 911.
-Local Level First Responder
6.3.2. Rescue Request Channels
The range in number of requests for rescue that the survey respondents received is very
large. This is to be expected since not all of the organizations represented in the survey are
directly involved in rescue activities. Survey respondents in the Houston area reported receiving
between 2 - 32,000 rescue requests on SM. On average, responders reported receiving only
about 3% of the number of their total rescue requests through Twitter, with the majority received
through Facebook. The combined average number of reported requests was 2,001 per
organization, with FRs reporting an average of about 2,879 per organization, GOVs reported an
average of 217, and NGO-Cs reported an average of 382. Additionally, one local-level quasigovernmental organization reported over 4.3 million total organic impressions (a metric
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describing the number of times content is displayed, whether clicked or not) over 8 days on
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram by posting information about local conditions and resources
available to flood victims.
6.3.3. Frequency of Checking Social Media
We were interested in how often respondents with dedicated SM personnel checked their
Twitter accounts during regular use, in addition to during Harvey. Respondents acknowledging
employing dedicated SM personnel were asked “how often does he or she monitor the Twitter
activity?” Then, "how often did your organization use Twitter during Hurricane Harvey?"
First responders report checking their Twitter more often than GOVs and NGO-Cs, with
95% checking multiple times per day. While just over three-quarters (76%) of GOVs check their
Twitter multiple times each day, all FR and GOV respondent report checking at least once per
day. NGO-Cs report checking their Twitter less often, as 22% report checking their Twitter
accounts less than once every week, and only about half check Twitter multiple times each day.
Figure 6.5 illustrates how respondents monitor SM with three levels of frequency ranging from
less than once every week to multiple times per day. This finding suggests first responders and

Figure 6.5. Frequency of Social Media Monitoring. Data Source:
Survey Question 9. N=46.
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government-related agencies and offices may offer the greatest listenability, while fewer NGOCs keep close contact with SM audiences.
Survey respondents reported less certainty regarding the frequency they monitored
Twitter activity during Hurricane Harvey, indicated by grey shading in Figure 6.6 below. The
FRs survey respondents reported the most uncertainty concerning Twitter monitoring of any
group, with over one in three (36%) indicating they did not know how often their organization
check Twitter, and only 60% report checking Twitter multiple times per day. GOV respondents
report continuing to check SM at similar frequencies of non-emergency times, with still about
one-quarter (72%) checking Twitter multiple times each day. The ratio of NGO-C respondents
who report checking SM multiple times day was the same as during non-emergency times, with
56% checking Twitter during Hurricane Harvey. NGO-Cs also reported a large amount of
uncertainty, as 22% did not know how often their organization monitored SM.

Figure 6.6. Frequency Respondents Monitored Twitter Accounts during
Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Data Source: Survey Question 10. N=52.
6.4. Addressing Common Social Media Challenges
Research Question 3.2: How did survey respondents address commonly reported
obstacles concerning the use of social media during disasters?
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Enhancing risk and crisis communication with the incorporation of SM requires EMs to
adopt bi-directional communication tactics on unofficial or new communication channels.
Channels like WEA or 911 are official channels that are restrictive and dedicated to EM, making
SM unofficial or alternative. For public information officers (PIOs), these changes have been
described as transitioning from the role of a gatekeeper to a translator, who interacts with more
of the public and more often (Hughes and Palen 2012). This evolution in the role of PIOs often
presents burdensome new technical, social, and socio-technical challenges. These include
challenges such as anonymity and unknown location of individuals posting on SM. Here, we
explore how responders in the Texas and the Houston area report strategies and tactics to
enhance risk and crisis communication.
6.4.1. Survey Respondents Likelihood of Employing Personnel Dedicated to Monitoring
Social Media
The second research objective previously found that insufficient staffing is a commonly
reported obstacle in studies exploring challenges of SM for risk and crisis communicators.
Employing assigned SM personnel is encouraged by the NECP, including recommendations to
implement communication-related roles and ensure operational planning incorporates new
technologies (DHS 2014a).
Four in five (80%) survey respondents report employing assigned SM personnel. GOV
respondents were most likely (94%) to utilize assigned SM personnel, followed by NGO-Cs
(75%), then FRs (74%). Figure 6.7 illustrates these findings, which indicate the responses of
FRs indicate greater uncertainty than the other groups, at 21% being unsure whether they have
assigned SM personnel. This survey question asked whether respondents had personnel assigned
to monitor Twitter specifically, potentially skewing the results of respondents who focus on SM
with larger audiences such as Facebook as indicated in the results. However, a review of the
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data found that respondents always monitoring Twitter also report always monitoring an
additional three SM channels.

Figure 6.7. Organizations with Assigned Social Media Personnel. Data
Source: Survey Question 8. N=64.
6.4.2. Prioritizing Rescue Requests
We also were interested in whether the respondents had developed or applied any type of
decision criteria to prioritize the requests they received for help from the public. We asked
survey respondents: “If there are multiple requests, how did you or your organization determine
who would be rescued first? Please check all that apply.”
Respondents indicated their prioritization of seven response options regarding
prioritization of rescue requests with the option of contributing an open-ended response. Twothirds (66%) of survey respondents indicate one single method for determining how to prioritize
multiple rescues, though responses were largely split among the top two response options. The
most commonly reported method to determine how to prioritize multiple requests for help
(Figure 6.9) was based on the health conditions of flood victims, followed closely by distance to
the victims. While FR and GOV respondents placed greater priority on the health conditions of
victims, one-fifth of NGO-C responses indicating distance being the most important factor (tied
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with not having policy for prioritization) contributed significantly to the second and third top
methods in Figure 6.8.

Figure 6.8. Reported Methods to Prioritize Social Media Rescue Requests. Data Source:
Survey Question 17. N=41.
The most commonly offered other method of prioritizing rescue calls was based on the
availability of resources in the areas of the call, which may be stretched thin during a disaster.
While jurisdiction and geographic reach of public agencies and NGO-Cs may be a common
deciding factor in typical response scenarios, operationalizing flood rescues presents a unique
problem in which flood patterns may vary around the contours of local topography. During
unprecedented events such as 2017 Hurricane Harvey, responders must consider the logistics of
transportation required to cross areas of both inundation and dry land, possibly more than once,
in which neither boats nor typical response vehicles can operate. In an ABC News interview on
August 27, Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo discussed prioritizing calls based on flood depth,
adding that some victims were calling for help with only an inch of water in their homes while
other were stranded in attics (ABC News 2017). These findings suggest responders took more of
an ad hoc approach to prioritize requests.
102

6.4.3. Information Sharing on Social Media
Another important topic concerns the extent to which these organizations shared
information with other groups on SM. Interagency communication is critical for developing
adequate situational awareness and achieving the common objective of emergency management,
and supports the goals of the 2014 NECP, including the recommendation to “increase intra-State
collaboration of communications, broadband, and information technology activities” (DHS
2014a).
Overall, 56% of survey respondents report not using Twitter to share information about
flood victims with other potential rescuers on Twitter. This question received a limited number
of responses, potentially because respondents overwhelmingly preferred to utilize Facebook over
other social media platforms. Survey findings suggest FRs and GOVs were less likely to share
information about flood victims on SM than NGO-Cs.
6.5. Recommendations for Improving Social Media for Disaster Response
Research Question 3.3: Which recommendations do responders suggest could improve
the utility of social media in future emergencies?
Survey respondents answered questions about improving SM, specifically Twitter, to
assist rescue and response efforts in future emergencies, reporting on useful tactics, features, and
difficulties based on experience during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Survey question 20 asked
respondents: “Do you have suggestions on how to improve the use of Twitter for future
emergencies? Please check all that apply.” Question 20 included three pre-determined
recommendations and included the option for respondents to offer open-ended responses. The
following question (21) asked respondents to rate the potential usefulness of a range of webbased tools, specifically asking: “Which tool(s) could help rescue operations? Please select a
score on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very useless and 5 being very useful?" The question
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included four examples of web-based tools followed by the opportunity to contribute text
responses. The following discussion highlights reported difficulties and suggestions for
improving SM-assisted disaster response contributed by these questions.
6.5.1. Difficulties of Social Media and Suggested Improvements
We included an open-ended question designed to gather additional information from
respondents concerning suggestions for how to improve social media use during large-scale
emergencies. A dozen respondents shared their observations and advice based on first-hand
experience with SM. These include seven first responders, two government-related agencies and
organizations, and three non-government organizations. The following are selected responses
concerning difficulties and potential improvements to SM use during these events.
We cannot currently convert Facebook / Twitter / etc messages into emergency calls.
That is step one. Beyond that, there is little current functionality to categorize messages
by type (information request, emergency needs, etc) and no live location attached.
–Local Level First Responder
Two first responders suggested flood victims should only use 911 dispatch or set
emergency lines to request help. While one offered the “trolls on social media that simply
interrupt,” (county level first responder), the second (local level first responder) suggested social
media is useful for coordinating volunteers and rescue resources. For example, League City
Police relied heavily on their Facebook network to leverage community resources and to
coordinate volunteer rescue boats (Figure 6.9). Another local-level first responder expressed
their barrier to the use of social media was technical based on their capabilities, which are
limited by the antiquated legacy 911 systems.
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Figure 6.9: League City Police Department Facebook Post Coordinating
Community Resources.
Other first responders embraced the utility of unofficial channels. A state-level first
responder suggested that a “creeper bar”, a banner that continuously shares emergency contact
options would have cut down on their requests for this information with 911 systems became
inoperable. Another local level FR offered that the SM platform Nextdoor was very useful for
rescue operations, to view and deploy resources as they became available, noting the use of SM
required dedication at the station level where officers provided constant updates and
communication in a north Houston community. Hurricane Harvey may have been the first major
disaster that responders reported relying on the popular neighborhood networking app Nextdoor;
a finding supported by Nextdoor associate Caitlin Lee, who found Houston-area agencies shared
over 1,200 posts and 3,000 urgent alerts, which received 10,000 replies and 55,000 “likes” (Lee
2018). Another local level first responder provided features that would make social media most
useful to their organization in order to optimize data collection and retention.
This could be an absolutely amazing tool if done right to allow one side for those
requesting rescue and allowing them to add age, number health problems etc, and update
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their status. Then a separate side for the rescuers to track all rescuers, see an exact
location of requests, update their status and see/show completed rescues. It would also
need to allow for downloading the data for updates and post event review.
-Local Level First Responder
One local government-related respondent reported social media was “extremely useful”
in handling coordinating emergency government aid. A state level government-related
respondent expressed difficulty getting local responders on board with social media, suggested
social media was used to disseminate information, supplementing information offered through
official channels.
Getting PD and Fire on board with social media is hard. We still relied heavily on 911 for
direct calls. Social media was used for general information purposes only.
-State Level Government-related Agency or Office
While all three non-government accounts of social media use mentioned the use of
Facebook, one county level NGO-C reported also coordinating recovery efforts through email
and the web. A local NGO-C reported using Twitter and Instagram in addition to Facebook to
share local updates on conditions and available resources. Lastly, another local level NGO-C
reported using Facebook and email to direct requests for assistance to the proper authorities.
To my knowledge we mainly used Facebook during Harvey. This is where we received
the most requests for assistance. We did receive some email requests for rescue. I
remember one that someone from Houston called Austin radio station, they then turned to
Salvation Army in Austin who then forwarded information to me in Houston. For those, I
reached out to a friend in the Harris County Emergency Office, so she could pass along to
Fire Department. The way we used Facebook was mainly in getting food and other
immediate needs to flood survivors.
-Local Level Non-Government Organization
Survey respondents contributed an average of 1.7 suggestions to improve Twitter for
future emergencies when provided three pre-selected suggestions, with a fourth option for text
entry for respondents with “other” suggestions. Figure 6.10 illustrates findings expressed as a
ratio of selection within respondent groups. Survey respondents cumulatively identified
educating users on how to use Twitter to contact dispatchers and volunteers would be most
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useful for future emergencies. User education is the most-selected option of first responders by
ratio. The second most-reported suggestion was to create special hashtags for emergency
rescue, which was the top-selected suggestion of government-related agencies and offices and
NGO-Cs. Respondents proportionately reported creating special accounts for users to contact
when they need emergency rescue least often, receiving the least support of government-related
agencies and offices.

Figure 6.10. Suggestions for Improving Twitter for Future Emergencies. Data Source:
Survey Question 20. N=41.
First responders mostly represented by local-level agencies contributed 80% of helpful
qualitative responses. A state-level FR expressed frustration with Twitter, which all other
responses related in some manner. Three of the five responses contained frustration with
difficulty determining the status of a rescue. One NGO-C respondent added the process was
time consuming, a finding consistent with a news story covering the issues surrounding the
legacy 911 systems (Kelly 2017). Another NGO-C suggested the (Facebook) safety check
feature would help address the issue for Twitter, a first responder added Facebook was more
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beneficial for their agency overall because it contains more useful tools and a greater audience
among the public.
Dont think Twitter will ever be especially useful in this situation. Its like talking in a
crowded bar; you cant really hear anything because of all the noise.
-State Level First Responder
Determining the location of flood victims was the second most common frustration
expressed in the text responses. Responders added that showing up to inaccurate addresses
delayed response times. In the same sense, a local first responder suggested Twitter was only
useful for sharing information with the public. Lastly, a county level first responder suggested
making social media two sided (adding features and capabilities for responders) would help
simplify the coordination of volunteers, adding that making the data downloadable would ease
tracking the status and post-event review.
6.5.2. Potentially Useful Social Media Tools
Respondents contributed their opinions of the potential benefit of supplemental social
media tools, with the option of text entry for “other” tools. The magnitude of usefulness was
captured through a five-point Likert-type response matrix, illustrated in Figure 6.11, in which a
score of one is least and five is most useful. While the lowest score “not at all useful” was never
selected, “slightly useful” was only ever selected by 6% of respondents. Contrarily, 47% of
respondents felt all three tools would be “extremely useful”, of which one in five provided
additional attributes of useful tools through text response.
The most desired social media tool was a map with real time requests for rescue. First
responders and government-related agencies and organizations favored this response option
most, with first responders reporting the greatest usefulness of any respondent groups for any
suggested tool. The second most useful tool reported by survey respondents was a map with
real-time flood depth, the preferred tool of NGO-Cs, and least concern of first responders. A
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platform to coordinate with other organizations was least selected overall, though preferred by
first responders over other groups.

Figure 6.11. Potentially Beneficial Social Media Tools Data Source: Survey Question 21.
N=41.
6.6. Summary of Findings
This case study contributed knowledge to the literature regarding the use of SM to assist
rescue efforts during Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Original survey findings presented accounts of
SM use by 64 first responders, government-related agencies and offices, and non-government
organizations. We found at least 89% of survey respondents hold a social media account, a rate
similar to that of Hurricane Isaac and Sandy study area survey respondents, through only threequarters of Harvey survey respondents used social media to assist rescue efforts.
The Harvey survey respondents preferred SM communication channels that were
consistent with those reported by organizations within the Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy study
areas. All government-related agencies and offices and non-government organizations reported
using Facebook during the Harvey response effort, with the second- most popular channels
respectively for each respondent group being Twitter and websites. Nine in ten first responders
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reported using Facebook and about six in ten use Twitter. Further investigation found first
responders’ use of social media was limited by their inability to convert requests from the public
received through SM into dispatchable rescue missions, thereby relying solely on the
overwhelmed and outdated 911 system. Survey findings also supported the notion that
Hurricane Harvey was the first major disaster in which responders utilized the neighborhood SM
platform Nextdoor to communicate with community networks suggested by Lee (2018).
First responders reported checking SM during Harvey with the greatest frequency, and
non-government organizations reporting monitoring social media the least. The survey
respondents reported receiving rescue requests on social media, with Facebook the most
common platform and only about 3% of rescue requests received through Twitter. About 80% of
respondents maintained assigned social media personnel to handle these requests. Governmentrelated offices were most likely to employ social media personnel, with first responders least
likely. This finding differed from the findings of the first survey, where NGO-Cs most
commonly reported employing dedicated social media personnel.
While government-related respondents and first responders report prioritizing rescue
requests based on the health of the victim, non-government organization most commonly
reported prioritizing based on distance to the victim. Over half of the respondents reported not
using Twitter to share information with other potential rescuers despite being the second most
commonly used social media platform used during the Harvey response efforts.
Lastly, first responders commonly reported frustration with SM and indicated they were
unable to convert social media requests to dispatchable missions to assist people in need.
Government-related respondents noted that getting first responders to participate on SM was
difficult. This finding suggests some government-related agencies and offices may be unfamiliar
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with the technical barriers faced by first responders, who report an inability to incorporate SM
communication into organizational communication strategies because wired 911 dispatch
systems are incompatible with web-based communication protocol. Non-government
respondents reported using Facebook, email, and the web to coordinate rescue missions, while
others used Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to share local updates. The most common
suggestion for improving social media for disasters was to educate the users on how to contact
dispatchers and volunteer organizations. The most valued potential web tool selected by
respondents was a real-time map of rescue requests, which was requested by survey respondents
in both surveys.
Several researchers have expressed the value of supporting listenable communication
channels, or listenability of SM (Latonero and Shklovski 2011). Maintaining listenability and
supporting bi-directional communication with community members may help to develop
institutional trust in, which in turn has the potential to increase the effectiveness of crisis
communications (Hughes and Chauhan 2015). First responders who contributed to flood rescues
following the landfall of Harvey responders indicated they provided a high level of listenability
in the wake of Huricane Harvey, but also reported major challenges with how to handle the
information found on SM. This finding was somwhat consistent with the first survey, in which
survey respondents indicated interest and noted the value in using SM to pull information from
the public, but did not report much experience doing so. The findings of the second survey
suggest that responders could benefit much more from SM if dispatch centers could be upgraded
to more adaptable web-based 911 systems.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
7.1. Summary of Findings and Research Implications
The overall aim of this dissertation was to provide new and useful insights about how
social media (SM) has been used in recent large-scale hurricanes by key organizations that
comprise the “whole community” of emergency management (EM). Research objectives I and II
present original survey findings collected from 269 public agencies and organizations in the EM
field in areas affected by 2012 Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy. Research objective III includes a
case study exploring how SM was used to assist flood rescues in the Houston, Texas area during
the response phase of Hurricane Harvey in 2017.
7.1.1. Research Objective I
The first research objective was to examine how members of the whole community of
EM report using SM, including when they use SM relative to the four phases of EM
(preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation), how their SM preferences align with those of
the public, and the barriers they may have encountered. We found that 90% of survey
respondents report using SM in their EM work, a rate consistent with the findings of other
researchers. The 10% of organizations in this survey that reported not using SM consisted
mostly of NGOs, of which the majority stated that it is not their mission to participate in risk and
crisis communication with the public through SM.
This research found that the primary role or rationale for SM use by these organizations
is to supplement their established communications on official channels by disseminating or
pushing information out to online audiences. Survey respondents reported optimistically about
SM’s ability to extend the reach of their communications and its potential for increasing public
engagement. They seemed less certain about the utility of SM to gather valuable or consistently
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useful information from the public. Despite their eagerness to benefit from SM, the majority of
respondents reported less ambition regarding gathering or pulling information from the public
using SM. Specifically, most respondents agreed that SM has a limited ability to crowdsource
information from community members or to identify individuals in need of assistance. The
exception was news media organizations, who report being most comfortable with activities
involving pulling information from the public through SM. As the Department of Homeland
Security Social Media Working Group recommends, all parties involved with risk and crisis
communication on SM could benefit from pulling information from SM. Therefore, it may be
advantageous for news media organizations, who report more involvement with using SM to pull
information from the public, to demonstrate their tactics to others in the EM field who are
interested in maximizing the benefits of SM. Survey respondents also indicated SM could be
used to enhance community disaster resilience by maintaining dialogue with the public during all
phases of the EM cycle to engage citizens and build relationships in the community. Introducing
exercises utilizing pull tactics could help EMs develop experience and knowledge with these
advanced SM operations between disasters as an approach to maintain communications with
community members.
Preferences for SM channels were similar across the four respondent groups, with
Facebook being the top choice of all groups. Nearly all (97%) SM users indicated using
Facebook to respond to the public at least sometimes, followed by 84% using Twitter and 52%
using Instagram at least sometimes. Respondents were least likely to utilize Google+, Nextdoor,
and Snapchat. Facebook is the preferred SM platform among the general population in the US
and among the organizations involved in EM. However, the adoption rates of newer popular SM
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platforms, such as Instagram, by respondents seem to lag behind the growing audiences, which
quickly outpaced public subscription to Twitter in its second year.
The first research objective found respondents in each group report SM could be used to
enhance disaster resilience by maintaining communication with the public on a regular basis
through all phases of EM, which is a recommendation made in the National Emergency
Communication Plan (NECP) for improving emergency communications. Researchers agree the
quiet times between emergencies present the most opportunity for building relationship in the
community to foster credibility and build trust in risk and crisis information providers. This may
lead community members to follow the advice of public warning messages, thus reducing the
amount of time spent milling, or looking for information in personal networks when individuals
face an unfamiliar risk to public safety or health (Hughes and Chauhan 2015, Janoke, Liu, and
Sheppard 2012, Wood et al. 2017). The quiet time between emergency events includes the
mitigation phase in FEMA’s four-phase model of emergency management, the phase of lowest
reported use of SM by the survey respondents to communicate with the public. Other works
suggest that building relationships with community members helps facilitate the development of
social capital, which is an important factor contributing to resilience to disasters (Aldrich and
Meyer 2015). Respondents also suggest that redundancy in number of communication channels
supported by risk and crisis communicators could help to narrow the gap in bi-directional,
citizen-government communication by reaching more individuals. However, adopting more SM
communication channels or platforms may be problematic for organizations following the
restrictive nature of National Incident Management System (NIMS) protocol.
The first survey found that respondents representing government and public safety offices
report using SM more during the response and the preparedness phases, while those performing
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secondary roles in risk and crisis communication, such as news media and non-governmental
organizations, report more SM activity during the recovery phase. This suggests organizations
performing primary and secondary roles in EM may play complementary roles in risk and crisis
communications with the public across the phases of emergency management. It is noteworthy
that the survey respondents from each of the groups reported the lowest use of SM to
communicate with the public during the quiet times between emergencies, or the mitigation
phase of emergency management. This finding suggests an opportunity for the groups that
comprise the whole community of emergency management to increase their public
communication efforts via SM during this quiet phase when the immediate demands of the crisis
and its aftermath have passed.
7.1.2. Research Objective II
The second research objective sought to identify obstacles and challenges regarding the
use of SM including the emergence of new challenges, and tactics and strategies applied to
overcome common challenges. Finding were presented between two groups instead of four to
examine the potential influence of the NIMS on the challenges faced by government (GOV)
versus non-government (NGO) type respondents, since NGOs are not guided by NIMS. Also,
we were interested in detecting new or emerging challenges that may not have been identified in
earlier examinations of SM use among the EM field. The remainder of the second research
objective explored strategies respondents employ to overcome some common challenges.
The survey respondents reported that the most significant challenges are the unknown
accuracy of information on SM, followed by insufficient human resources to manage SM use
within their organizations, and the challenges presented through anonymity of users on SM. This
finding is the first known case in the literature indicating that concerns about information
accuracy is a top concern among EMs. NGO respondents expressed higher levels of concern
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about each of these issues than GOV respondents. Additional problems noted by the survey
respondents included information and communication infrastructure failure and problems with
internet connectivity, followed by the low level of user-friendliness of SM for emergency
management, then language and cultural barriers.
Regarding the extent to which these EM organizations attempt to evaluate the
effectiveness of their online communications, we found that NGOs express greater interest in
observing various audience behaviors than government agencies. NGO respondents also
reported greater involvement in SM campaign-evaluation tactics and strategies to increase
audience size and level of interaction. These findings suggest NGOs may put forth greater effort
to encourage growth of their online audiences in order to reach more people.
We identified several tactics and strategies reported by the respondents to overcome
obstacles to more effective SM use in their EM work. NGOs and GOVs reported similar rates of
policy adoption within their organizations since 2012 to better respond to public comments and
concerns, assign dedicated SM personnel, develop target goals for their SM communications,
implement around-the-clock SM monitoring, leverage additional support to meet high demand
for communication during emergencies, and develop policies regarding following other SM
users. In general, we found that efforts to evaluate the reach and impact of communication
campaigns with the public are much more likely to be implemented by NGOs than government
organizations. However, we found that NGOs report committing less attention to the verification
of the accuracy of information before sharing it with the public on SM. Therefore, NGOs may
be more susceptible to the inadvertent spreading of misinformation during and after a disaster.
The second research objective identified common challenges that are both internal and
external to reporting public agencies and non-governmental organizations. As organizations
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move toward the institutionalization of SM as described by Mergel and Bretschneider (2013),
they develop policies and allocate resources to support their SM campaign objectives. Lessons
learned from experience with SM help to make challenges of SM communication more
predictable and more likely for EMs to overcome. Through this process of campaign
development, the challenges that are internal to the organizations may be mitigated against. The
survey findings indicate both GOVs and NGOs report greater concern toward external-type
challenges, with NGOs reporting higher levels of concern toward these challenges than the
governmental organizations. When asked in an open-ended question about any other challenges
of social media communication, only 13% of responses described internal-type challenges.
These findings suggest the social media campaigns of respondents’ organizations have matured
into the “institutionalization” phase of SM adoption, as both groups report less concern toward
internal-type challenges such as insufficient human resources and SM competence.
7.1.3. Research Objective III
The third research objective was to examine the use of SM during the emergency
response phase of Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The case study reports on original survey findings
contributed by 64 respondents organized into three groups to better understand how they used
SM. The groups are: first responders (FR), government-related agencies and offices (GOV), and
non-government organizations (NGO) – including news media organizations due to limited
responses from that group. –The case study explored topics including specific channels they
used to communicate with the public, popular channels they received rescue requests through,
organizational resources and SM policies, and recommendations for improving the functionality
of SM for future disasters.
Harvey responders reported using the same top six web-based communication channels
as the respondents in the first survey, with Facebook being the most popular. Respondents
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reported receiving a wide range in number of requests for assistance from the public, with FRs
receiving the most of the three groups. We were interested in the extent to which these
organizations monitored their social media during the emergency and during non-emergency or
routine times. We found that while the GOVs observed the greatest number of SM channels,
FRs reported checking their SM most often during the emergency. These findings suggest FRs
may possess the greatest “listenability”, but on a narrower spectrum of channels. Interestingly,
nearly all rescue requests were channeled through Facebook rather than Twitter. This finding
highlights the importance of maintaining flexibility in terms of supporting listenability on
multiple channels. While previous studies found Twitter played an important role in the
response and recovery phases of other recent disasters, our findings suggest Twitter was not used
as extensively as other platforms such as Facebook and Nextdoor, which respondents reported
using to maintain contact with the public and coordinate community resources.
Several FR survey respondents reported significant difficulty or inability to convert
requests received on SM to dispatchable rescue missions. This and other challenges, including
routing calls away from damaged Public Safety Answering Points, present technical barriers for
legacy wired 911 systems still in use throughout much of the US. Legacy wired 911 systems are
unable to support web-based communications. As a result, incorporating SM communications
into the protocol of FRs would require agencies to upgrade PSAP dispatch technologies to a
more adaptable system such as Next Generation 911, a web-based adaptable PSAP system
already being used in parts of the US.
When asked how respondents prioritized calls for assistance, a division was apparent
between respondents acting under the direction of NIMS (FR and GOV) and NGOs. The GOV
and FR respondents who are responsive to the NIMS guidelines reported prioritizing requests
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based on the health conditions of the victim, while NGOs most commonly reported prioritizing
requests for assistance based on distance to the individual(s) in need. Prioritizing requests based
on distance may indicate NGOs lacked resources such as high-water vehicles capable of
traversing dynamic landscapes such as crossing between inundated and dry land to reach flood
victims. Altogether, decision criteria used to prioritize requests for help among the survey
respondent groups were varied, suggesting responders took more of an ad hoc approach to
maximize their performance based on the available resources.
We were interested also in the amount of interagency communication conducted on SM.
We asked respondents about sharing information about flood victims on Twitter based on the
assumption that greater interagency communication helps to improve situational awareness. The
findings suggest over half (56%) did not use Twitter to communicate with other agencies about
flood victims. The low reported rate of information sharing may be attributed to two conditions.
First, EMs maintain access to channels dedicated to emergency communication. Using
unofficial channels to share potentially sensitive information is not recommended by NIMS
protocol. Second, compared to other ITC including email and Facebook, few survey respondents
reported using Twitter during Harvey.
Finally, we were interested in the recommendations to improve the utility of social media
in future emergencies. Among the Hurricane Harvey survey respondents, several provided
thoughtful feedback with suggestions to increase the effectiveness of SM during disasters. These
included addressing the incompatibility of the legacy wired phone systems with web-based
communications, a problem that limits the abilities of PSAPs to respond to requests for
assistance. Other respondents provided insights on how they benefitted from SM, such as using
Facebook to coordinate community resources (e.g. putting out a call for shallow-draw boats) to
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contribute to rescue efforts. The neighborhood SM platform Nextdoor allowed responders to
disseminate information rapidly at the neighborhood level to supplement official channels, and
provided a responsive link for bi-directional communication between responders and citizens.
Lastly, echoing a resonating theme throughout the study relating to the need for more bidirectionality in emergency communications, survey respondents suggested they could benefit
more from SM during a disaster if Facebook was two-sided to provide additional functions for
responders. For example, a back-end, or separate application for platforms like Facebook could
be engineered to allow government-related agencies to collect and store information about the
victims requesting assistance. Attaching a web form to Facebook’s Safety Check feature would
allow responders to compile and display rescue requests geographically, including information
about the victims such as age and any health concerns or physical limitations. A map or visual
display of the calls for assistance, relevant attributes of the callers, and the rescue status of each
call would support more efficient and effective responses.
Several researchers have expressed the need and value of supporting listenable
communication channels, or listenability of SM (Latonero and Shklovski 2011). Maintaining
listenability and supporting bi-directional communication with community members may help to
develop institutional trust, which in turn has the potential to increase the effectiveness of crisis
communications (Hughes and Chauhan 2015). These findings offer additional insight about the
challenges to bi-directional communication during large-scale crises. While, first responders
who contributed to flood rescues following the landfall of Harvey indicated they provided a high
level of listenability in the wake of the storm, they also reported major technical problems, such
as how to handle the information gathered through or observed on SM. By contrast, survey
respondents from the areas affected by Hurricanes Sandy and Issaac indicated interest and noted
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the value in using SM to pull information from the public at greater rates, but did not report
much experience actually doing it. The findings of the Hurricane Harvey respondents suggests
emergency responders could benefit much more from SM if dispatch centers could be upgraded
to more adaptable, web-based 911 systems.
7.2. Research Contributions and Limitations
The dissertation research contributed knowledge to the literature regarding the use of SM
by public agencies and organizations filling primary or secondary roles in EM. While the
intersection of SM and EM has been studied in recent years, this research aimed to generate new
information about how members of the whole community of EM utilize SM for risk and crisis
communication with respect to the four phases of the EM cycle. The findings were derived from
two original survey instruments made available to respondents in 2018 in areas affected by
Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012, and by Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The work identified
important barriers to the use of SM in the EM field, new challenges, and examples of best
practice techniques and lessons learned from recent disasters.
The work also provided a systematic technique to develop study populations using
keyword-combination queries to sample relevant agencies and organizations in a defined area
using Twitter Search. The combined study population contained nearly two thousand public
agencies and organizations assumed to be involved in risk and crisis communication, along with
SM network statistics, audience sizes, age of SM accounts, and additional baseline information
to support additional or comparative analysis in the future.
While the sampling methodology included robust querying, it also introduced potential
bias into the findings by only identifying public agencies and organizations publicly visible and
active on SM. Authors of some related studies relied on snowball sampling (Su et al. 2012) and
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arduous examinations of public records to guide web queries to compile a comprehensive dataset
containing all fire and police agencies in the study area (Hughes et al., 2014). However, these
methods were not appropriate for the nature of the study, which sought feedback from public
agencies and organizations of the whole community of EM already active on SM. In fact,
relying on systematic Twitter queries to identify potential survey respondents (as done here) for
counties and states with FEMA disaster declarations following Hurricane Sandy allowed for the
compilation of a sample population of police and fire accounts with “join dates” prior to August
2012 nearly twice as large as the sampling method developed by Hughes et al. (2014).
7.3. Future Research
Enhancing risk and crisis communication helps public information brokers narrow riskrelated communication gaps. Communication gaps may include vital information about safety
not reaching all residents and/or the needs of the public not being identified quickly by
emergency managers. The findings presented in this dissertation indicate dissipating concern
surrounding some of the earlier challenges to SM that were found to be of great concern as
reported in recent studies. These results suggest that experience implementing SM and the
guidance provided by the federal government in recent years have facilitated greater use and
confidence in the utility and applicability of SM in emergency management. The concerns
expressed by the survey respondents point to a new set of challenges, and the most significant
among them is the growing issue of false or inaccurate information being spread during and after
the crisis. Non-governmental organizations expressed greater concern over this problem than
did the government-related organizations. Government agencies and offices tend to disseminate
information from official sources to the public, and thus may have more confidence in the
information they share. However, questions about the accuracy of the information gathered from
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the public by both government and NGOs, may make maintaining the important capacity of
“listenability” with the public during the four phases of an emergency more difficult.
Overall, these results show that SM is widely used by key groups that comprise the whole
community of emergency management, and that they play complementary roles in risk and crisis
communication. Future studies could build upon the baseline information developed here to
identify changes in the objectives, methods and evaluation strategies used by these types of
organizations concerning their use of social media for emergency management. Further, the
specific technical recommendations offered by those groups that were active during the response
phase of Hurricane Harvey offer useful insights into how SM could be made more responsive
and interactive to enhance the efficiency of rescue efforts. Understanding the ways in which SM
enhances emergency management activities throughout the preparation, response, recovery and
mitigation phases, as well as the limitations of current platforms and technology provides
researchers, practitioners and residents with useable knowledge to inform future investment and
planning for more effective emergency management.
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Appendix A. Obstacles Reported in the Literature
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Appendix B. Survey Instrument 1: Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy Responders
Survey Instrument

ICAR4.3_Survey1_RK
Start of Block: Screening Questions

Q0 Hello and welcome. We are ICAR, a multi-department research team at Louisiana State University.
Thank you for your interest in being part of our research study entitled “Understanding Social and
Geographical Disparities in Disaster Resilience Through Social Media” and funded by the National
Science Foundation. We are giving online surveys to agency and organization representatives in areas
that were affected by Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy. We are surveying about 1,500 agencies and
organizations directly active in or supporting functions of emergency management from the federal to
local levels. This research seeks to understand how they use social media, specifically Twitter to
communicate and gather information before, during, and after these hurricanes.
This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. Your participation in this research is
voluntary. You may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty
or loss of any benefit to which they might otherwise be entitled. Your name, and responses will be kept
confidential.
There are no direct benefits to you for participating in the survey, but the information gathered may
help us further understand disaster resilience in your community and for other communities across the
country. You do not face no more/greater than risks than you would come across in everyday life for
participating nor are there any costs to participate.
If you have questions about the study, you can contact any of the principal researchers at the contact
information listed below. This study has been approved by the LSU IRB. For questions concerning
participant rights, please contact the LSU Human Subjects Protection Program at 225-578-8692
(irb@lsu.edu).
Thank you again for your time and participation in our study. By clicking below to continue the survey,
you are indicating your consent to participate and allow us to collect your responses for research
purposes.
Sincerely,
Nina Lam, nlam@lsu.edu
Michelle Meyer, mmeyer@lsu.edu
Margaret Reams, reams@lsu.edu
Ryan Kirby, rkirby3@lsu.edu
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1.1 How would you describe the nature of the organization your Twitter account represents?
One:

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Charitable Organization (1)
Government-Related Agency or Office (2)
First Responder (3)
For Profit Non-Government Organization (4)
News Media Organization (5)
Non Profit Non-Government Organization (7)
Other, Please Explain: (6) ________________________________________________

1.2 How would you describe the geographic reach of your organization?

o
o
o
o

Select

Select One:

Local Organization representing a city, municipality, or neighborhood (4)
County-wide (3)
State-wide (2)
Nationally within the United States (1)

1.3 Please provide the geographic area for which your organization is most associated.
For Example, Appropriate Responses Include:
The United States
New Jersey

Escambia County, FL

Newport, RI

________________________________________________________________

1.4 Does your organization use social media to inform the public of emergencies?

o
o

Select One:

Yes (1)
No (2)

Skip To: 2.7 If Does your organization use social media to inform the public of public health crises or emergencies? =
Yes
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1.5 Why doesn't your organization use social media to inform the public of emergencies?
Select all that apply:

▢ Lack of Financial Resources (1)
▢ Lack of Human Resources (2)
▢ Lack of Policy or Protocol Regarding Social Media Use (3)
▢ Lack of Technology Resources (4)
▢ Lack of Training or Skills (5)
▢ Social Media has a Limited Ability to Reach our Target Audience (6)
▢ Uncertainty of the Accuracy of Information (7)
▢ Not Our Organization's Mission (9)
▢ Other, Please Explain: (8) ________________________________________________
1.6 Do you plan to incorporate social media into your organization's communication strategy in the
future?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
Maybe (2)
No (3)

Skip To: End of Survey If Do you plan to incorporate social media into your organization's communication strategy
in the fu... = Yes
Skip To: End of Survey If Do you plan to incorporate social media into your organization's communication strategy
in the fu... = Maybe
Skip To: End of Survey If Do you plan to incorporate social media into your organization's communication strategy
in the fu... = No
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2.7 How does your organization respond to public questions and comments?
Never (1)

About half the
time (3)

Sometimes (2)

Most of the
time (4)

Always (5)

Blog (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Email (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Google+ (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Facebook (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Instagram (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Mobile
Application (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Nextdoor (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Nixel (8)

o

o

o

o

o

Snapchat (9)

o

o

o

o

o

Text Message
Alerts (10)

o

o

o

o

o

Twitter (11)

o

o

o

o

o

Website (12)

o

o

o

o

o

Zello (13)

o

o

o

o

o

Traditional
News Media
(14)

o

o

o

o

o
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2.8 Which types of messages does your organization share over social media platforms?
Select All that apply:

▢ Press Release (1)
▢ Local Updates, Alerts, or Warnings (2)
▢ Retrospective or After-action Reports (3)
▢ "Send Us Your Pictures" or "Let us Know" Type Messages (4)
▢ Call for Action (click a link to read more, etc.) (6)
▢ Retweets of Citizens' Messages (7)
▢ Interactive Community Engagement/Networking (replying to individual users, acting as a part of
the community) (8)

▢ Responses to Media Organizations (9)
▢ Other (10) ________________________________________________
2.9 Does your organization validate information before sharing it with the public?
Select one:

o
o
o
o

Always (1)
Most of the time (2)
Sometimes (3)
Never (4)

Skip To: 2.11 If Does your organization validate information before sharing it with the public? Select one: = Never

2.10 How does your organization validate information before sharing with the public?
Select all that Apply:

▢ Sharing information only from official sources (1)
▢ Sharing information only from Verified Accounts (Twitter) (2)
▢ First person accounts from persons on the ground (3)
▢ No policy regarding information sharing on social media (4)
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2.11 How would you rate your organization’s use of social media during the following phases of
emergency management?
Never (1)

Sometimes (2)

Most of the time
(4)

Always (5)

Mitigation:
Preventing future
emergencies or
minimizing their
effects (For
Example:
conducting
inspections of
building safety) (1)

o

o

o

o

Preparedness:
Preparing to handle
an emergency (For
example: stocking
hurricane supplies)
(2)

o

o

o

o

Response:
Responding safely
to an emergency
(For example:
Checking official
news sources
before returning to
an affected area) (3)

o

o

o

o

Recovery:
Recovering from an
emergency (For
example: rebuilding
stronger after a
disaster) (4)

o

o

o

o

2.12 Does your organization have a plan to increase support for social media communications during a
crisis? (For Example: Assigning additional staff members to meet high demand)

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Not Sure (3)

Skip To: End of Block If Does your organization have a plan to increase support for social media communications
during a c... != Yes
Skip To: End of Block If Does your organization have a plan to increase support for social media communications
during a c... = Not Sure
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2.13 How does your organization increase capacity to monitor social media during crisis events?
Select all that apply:

▢ Ad Hoc Leveraging of Volunteers (1)
▢ Crisis Plan Diverting Support Within Organization (2)
▢ Crisis Plan Leveraging Third Party Organizations (3)
▢ Other, Please Explain: (4) ________________________________________________
3.14 Please describe your agreement with communicating risk-related information through social
media.
Strongly
Agree
(1)

Agree
(2)

Somewhat
Agree (3)

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree
(4)

Somewhat
Disagree
(5)

Disagree
(6)

Strongly
Disagree
(7)

Serves as primary
means of
communication (1)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Supplements primary
means of
communication though
other media outlets (2)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Collects information
from the public
through two-way
communications (3)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Assists and informs
official disaster
response strategies (4)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Identifies individuals in
need of assistance (5)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Will play a greater role
in crisis and risk
communication in the
future (6)

o

o

o

o

o

o

o
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3.15 Does your organization “follow” other users on social media? If so, how do you select who to
follow?
Select all that Apply:

▢ ⊗This is not a focus of our social media campaign (1)
▢ Following users in the local area (2)
▢ Following reputable verified sources of crisis or risk information (3)
▢ We have other criteria for selecting who to follow, such as: (4)
________________________________________________

3.16 Which audience behaviors does your organization seek to measure?
Select all that Apply:

▢ Awareness of organization (1)
▢ Online engagement with organization (2)
▢ Clicks and shares to organization’s website or mobile application (3)
▢ New advocates and fans of organization (4)
▢ Increasing organization’s online presence relative to competing organizations (5)
▢ ⊗None (7)
▢ Other, Please Explain: (6) ________________________________________________
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3.17 Which metrics do(es) your organization use to evaluate communication through social media?
Select all that Apply:

▢ Gather feedback from public (1)
▢ Monitor social media metrics with built-in features (2)
▢ Consultation with third party organizations (3)
▢ Use data collected from metrics to make efforts to expand reach of communications (4)
▢ Advertise or cross-reference social media profile elsewhere (5)
▢ ⊗We do not actively monitor communication success on social media accounts (6)
▢ Other, Please Explain: (7) ________________________________________________
3.18 When reaching out to a disaster-affected community, how would you rank the extent of concern
when confronted with the following common obstacles on social media?
Not a concern (1)

Small concern (2)

Major concern (3)

Difficulty or complexity of social
media (1)

o

o

o

Low subscription to social media
by public in the local area (2)

o

o

o

Insufficient human resources to
monitor social media (3)

o

o

o

Unknown accuracy of
Information on Social Media (4)

o

o

o

Anonymity of users (5)

o

o

o

Insufficient technology
resources (6)

o

o

o

Improper/Insufficient training
(7)

o

o

o

Lacking procedure or protocol
within agency/organization (8)

o

o

o

133

3.19 Are there other obstacles that you encounter when reaching out to a disaster-affected community
using social media?

o
o

None/Not Sure (1)
Please Explain: (2) ________________________________________________

3.20 Because some people do not use social media, do you think the uneven social media use (disparity)
may affect your emergency management to disasters?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Not Sure (3)

Skip To: 3.22 If Because some people do not use social media, do you think the uneven social media use (disparity)...
= No

3.21 Do you have any thoughts on how to improve disaster resilience through social media?
________________________________________________________________
3.22 How might social media benefit your organization in the future?
Unlikely (1)

Maybe (2)

Likely (3)

Providing means reach
more people than
traditional media (1)

o

o

o

Increasing public
engagement (2)

o

o

o

Tool for improving
situational awareness and
crowdsourcing
information (3)

o

o

o

Source of news and
information (4)

o

o

o

Other, Please Explain: (5)

o

o

o
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Carry Forward Selected Choices from "How does your organization respond to public questions and comments?"

4.23 Did your organization use these specific communication platforms during Hurricanes Isaac or Sandy
in 2012?
Yes (1)

No (2)

Not Sure (3)

Blog (x1)

o

o

o

Email (x2)

o

o

o

Google+ (x3)

o

o

o

Facebook (x4)

o

o

o

Instagram (x5)

o

o

o

Mobile Application (x6)

o

o

o

Nextdoor (x7)

o

o

o

Nixel (x8)

o

o

o

Snapchat (x9)

o

o

o

Text Message Alerts (x10)

o

o

o

Twitter (x11)

o

o

o

Website (x12)

o

o

o

Zello (x13)

o

o

o

Traditional News Media
(x14)

o

o

o

4.24 Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?

▼ 2006 (1) ... We do not use Twitter (13)
Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
We do not use Twitter
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=

Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
2013

=

Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
2014

=

Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
2015

=

Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
2016

=

Skip To: End of Survey If Which year did your organization begin Tweeting about disaster or emergency events?
2017

=

4.25 Did your organization use Twitter during Hurricane Isaac in August 2012?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Not Sure (3)

4.26 Did your organization use Twitter during Hurricane Sandy in October 2012?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Not Sure (3)

4.27 Which policies (if any) does your organization practice in respect to crisis or risk-related
communication on Social Media since Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012?
Select all that Apply:

▢ We have developed target goals and a plan for communicating on social media (1)
▢ We strive for rapid respond to public comments and concerns (2)
▢ We have a staff or team member dedicated to monitoring our social media accounts (3)
▢ Social media accounts are monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (4)
▢ Other, Please Explain: (5) ________________________________________________
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4.28 Has your organization changed social media policies since 2012?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Not Sure (3)

End of Block: Tweeting During Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy of 2012
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Appendix C. Survey Instrument 2: Hurricane Harvey Responders Survey
Instrument

Online Survey of New Twitter Use – Part 2:
Disaster Responders
Start of Block: Default Question Block

Q0 Hello and welcome. We are a multi-department research team at Louisiana State University.
Thank you for your interest in being part of our research study entitled “The Changing Roles of Social
Media in Disaster Resilience: The Case of Hurricane Harvey” and funded by the National Science
Foundation. During Hurricane Harvey many residents in Houston area sought help through social media
when the 911 system failed. We are surveying about 300 flood victims on their experience and opinions
in using Twitter or other social media for rescue during Hurricane Harvey. Your input is very important,
and we greatly appreciate your time in helping us understand this issue.
This survey will take
approximately 15 minutes of your time. Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may choose
not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time. Your name and responses will be kept
confidential.
There are no direct benefits to you for participating in the survey, but the information gathered may
help us further understand disaster resilience in your community and for other communities across the
country. You do not face no more/greater than risks than you would come across in everyday life for
participating nor are there any costs to participate.
If you have questions about our study, you can contact any of the principal researchers at the contact
information listed below. This study has been approved by the LSU Institutional Review Board (IRB). For
questions concerning participant rights, please contact the LSU Human Subjects Protection Program at
225-578-8692 (irb@lsu.edu).
Thank you again for your time and participation in our study. By clicking below to continue the survey,
you are indicating your consent to participate and allow us to collect your responses for research
purposes.
Sincerely,
Nina Lam, PhD. nlam@lsu.edu
Michelle Meyer, PhD. mmeyer@lsu.edu
Margaret Reams, PhD. reams@lsu.edu
Lei Zou, PhD. lzou4@lsu.edu
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Q1 Which category best describes your role as a rescuer?

o
o
o
o
o

Charitable Organization (1)
Government-Related Agency or Office (2)
First Responder (3)
For Profit Non-Government Organization (4)
Other, please specify: (5) ________________________________________________

Q24 What is the geographic reach of your organization?

o
o
o
o

Local (1)
County (2)
State (3)
National (4)

Q2 Could you provide the name of your organization?

o
o

Answer: (1) ________________________________________________
Not applicable (2)

Q3 Were you or your organization directly involved in emergency rescue efforts during Hurricane
Harvey?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't know (3)

Q4 Did you or your organization use the web to assist in rescue operations during Hurricane Harvey?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't know (3)

139

Q5 Did you or your organization use social media to assist in rescue operations during Hurricane Harvey?

o
o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't have a social media account (3)
Don't know (4)

Q6 Which social media platforms did your organization use during Hurricane Harvey?
Never (1)

About half the
time (3)

Sometimes (2)

Most of the
time (4)

Always (5)

Blog (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Email (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Google+ (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Facebook (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Instagram (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Nextdoor (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Nixel (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Snapchat (8)

o

o

o

o

o

Text Message
Alerts (9)

o

o

o

o

o

Twitter (10)

o

o

o

o

o

Website (11)

o

o

o

o

o

Zello (12)

o

o

o

o

o

Other: (13)

o

o

o

o

o

Skip To: Q8 If Which social media platforms did your organization use during Hurricane Harvey? != Blog
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Q7 Does your organization plan to create a Twitter account in the future?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't know (3)

Q8 Does your organization have someone assigned to report and monitor on Twitter?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't know (3)

Q9 How often does he or she monitor the Twitter activity?

o
o
o
o
o

Multiple times a day (1)
Once a day (2)
Once every week (3)
Less than once every week (4)
Don’t know (5)

Carry Forward Selected Choices from "How often does he or she monitor the Twitter activity?"

Q10 How often did your organization use Twitter during Hurricane Harvey?

o
o
o
o
o

Multiple times a day (1)
Once a day (2)
Once every week (3)
Less than once every week (4)
Don’t know (5)
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Q11 How did you or your organization receive requests for rescue?

▢ Blog (1)
▢ Email (2)
▢ Google+ (3)
▢ Facebook (4)
▢ Instagram (5)
▢ Nextdoor (6)
▢ Nixel (7)
▢ Snapchat (8)
▢ Twitter (9)
▢ Website (10)
▢ Zello (11)
▢ Other: (12) ________________________________________________
Q12 How many requests for rescue did you or your organization received from channels other than
Twitter?

o
o

Please estimate the number: (1) ________________________________________________
Don't know (2)

Q13 How many requests for rescue did you or your organization received from Twitter?

o
o

Please estimate the number: (1) ________________________________________________
Don't know (2)

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "How did you or your organization receive requests for
rescue? "
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Q14 Did you or your organization respond to the rescue requests? Please check all that apply:
Yes (1)

No (2)

Don't know (3)

Blog (x1)

o

o

o

Email (x2)

o

o

o

Google+ (x3)

o

o

o

Facebook (x4)

o

o

o

Instagram (x5)

o

o

o

Nextdoor (x6)

o

o

o

Nixel (x7)

o

o

o

Snapchat (x8)

o

o

o

Twitter (x9)

o

o

o

Website (x10)

o

o

o

Zello (x11)

o

o

o

Other: (x12)

o

o

o

Q15 How many households did you or your organization rescue from the flood?

o
o

Please estimate the number: (1) ________________________________________________
Don't know (2)

143

Q16 If you or your organization received requests for rescue on Twitter, how did you determine the
location of flood victims? Please check all that apply.

▢ Based on the tweet content (1)
▢ Based on the geo-tagged address attached to the tweet (2)
▢ Contacted the twitter user to determine the user’s location (3)
▢ Other, please specify: (4) ________________________________________________
Q17 If there are multiple requests, how did you or your organization determine who would be rescued
first? Please check all that apply.

▢ Based on the time of the Twitter request (1)
▢ Based on the flood depth (2)
▢ Based on the distance to the victims (3)
▢ Based on the health conditions of the victims (4)
▢ Based on the number of the victims (5)
▢ Based on the age of the victims (6)
▢ No specific policy (7)
▢ Other, please specify: (8) ________________________________________________
Q18 Did you or your organization use Twitter to share information about flood victims with other
potential rescuers on Twitter?

o
o
o

Yes (1)
No (2)
Don't know (3)
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Q19 Did you find Twitter or social media helpful in the rescue operation during Hurricane Harvey?
Please select a score on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being not helpful and 5 being very helpful?
Extremely
helpful (1)
Twitter was...
(1)

o

Very helpful (2)

o

Moderately
helpful (3)

o

Slightly helpful
(4)

o

Not at all
helpful (5)

o

Q20 Do you have suggestions on how to improve the use of Twitter for future emergencies? Please
check all that apply.

▢ Create special hashtags for emergency rescue (1)
▢ Create special accounts for users to contact when they need emergency rescue (2)
▢ Educate users on how to use Twitter to contact dispatchers or volunteer organizations (3)
▢ Other, please specify: (4) ________________________________________________
Page Break

Q21 Which tool(s) could help rescue operations? Please select a score on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
meaning very useless and 5 being very useful?
Extremely
useful (1)

Moderately
useful (3)

Very useful (2)

Slightly useful
(4)

Not at all useful
(5)

A map with realtime requests
for rescue (1)

o

o

o

o

o

A map with realtime flood
depth (2)

o

o

o

o

o

A platform to
coordinate with
other
organizations
(3)

o

o

o

o

o

Others, please
specify: (4)

o

o

o

o

o
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Q22 Do you have any additional comments or suggestions to improve the response and rescue
operations using social media?
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Default Question Block
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Appendix D. Improving Disaster Resilience with Social Media Text
Responses
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Appendix E. Exploring Communication Tactics Using Multiple Indicators of
Responsiveness
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Appendix F. Testing Respondent Self-Classification Accuracy
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Appendix G. Detailed Sampling Methodology
The Hurricane Isaac sampling area is defined as the 123 US counties and four respective
States which received federal assistance following Hurricane Isaac in August 2012. Sampling in
Isaac area resulted in the compilation of 380 Twitter accounts at the state and local levels.
Similarly, the Sandy sampling area is defined as the 93 US Counties, seven respective States, and
the District of Columbia, which received federal funding after the landfall of Hurricane Sandy in
October 2012. Sampling for Hurricane Sandy contributed 1,255 Twitter accounts to the sample.
Table AH1 illustrates the study area and study population overview.
Table AH1: Study Area Overview

Data Source: United States Census, 2010.
53 parishes plus the City of New Orleans counted as a metropolitan county-level geographic unit
2
23 counties and one Independent City
3
14 counties plus New York City counted as a single county-level geographic unit
1

Sampling Methodology
Twitter accounts were identified through a series of queries into the Twitter search bar.
Excel spreadsheets exported from FEMA shapefiles helped to preserve geographic ties for later
spatial analysis. The Twitter sample was developed From February until December of 2017
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through a several phases of data collection aimed at achieving geographic saturation,
methodological refinement, and quality control. The objective geographic saturation was to
collect at least one relevant account for each county and state in the study area. National, state,
and county level queries identified members of the whole community in the study area. Searches
were also performed for one major metropolitan area per study area, including New Orleans,
New York City and Houston.
The first round of sampling included the pairing of the names and abbreviations of
geographic areas with five keywords. For example, state level queries included “(state)
emergency”, “(state) disaster”, “(state) news”, “(state) police”, and “(state) fire”, then “(state
abbreviation) emergency”, “(state abbreviation) disaster”, “(state abbreviation) news”, “(state
abbreviation) police”, and “(state abbreviation) fire”. This method returned local government
and non-governmental organizations and individuals participating in disaster communication
such as local government leaders, fire chiefs, and non-governmental individuals delivering
emergency alerts. Twitter accounts were included in the database if the met three requirements:
Twitter accounts representing individuals were preferred against, although individuals
representing official positions in emergency management such as state and local government
leaders and high-ranking members of law enforcement and emergency response services were
included. News reporters communicating on behalf of news or press agencies were not included
in the database. Fashion, political, and business news outlets were excluded due to the subject of
news being reported.
The first round of sampling concluded in March of 2017 with the development of a
database containing 728 relevant Twitter accounts meeting the sampling criteria including the
collection contact information obtained from Twitter profiles and a simple binary classification
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relating accounts to government or non-government organizations, which is useful for the
polarization of survey data in the event of low response rates. Governmental emergency
management agencies and first responders fill a primary role in emergency management while
non-government organizations are considered to fill supporting roles.
The initial sample achieved 81% geographic saturation for the counties of the Sandy
study area and 23% for the Isaac study area. Additional literature review focusing on emergency
management in the US, social media, and the intersection of the topics and senior guidance
informed the development of a secondary method of Twitter sampling seeking geographic
saturation. Compelling evidence for the importance of chambers of commerce in the times
following a crisis (Wukich & Steinberg, 2013) indicated that a voice of the whole community of
emergency management would not be heard without sampling for chambers. This realization
provoked the realization that other important organization may not have been identified in the
broad-method initially employed. A second attempt to sample specific organizations was
necessary to target certain actors, referred to herein as direct searches.
The names (or acronyms) of organizations with a known role in emergency management
were queried into the Twitter search bar, then again paired with the names and abbreviations of
states and counties as in the first round of sampling. Direct searches occurred for thirteen
criteria including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

American Red Cross (ARC) – Queried as “Red Cross”
Chambers of Commerce – Queried as “Chamber”
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Queried as “Homeland Security”
Emergency Management Agency (EMA)
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
National Weather Service (NWS)
Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Principle Information Officer (PIO)
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•
•
•
•

Salvation Army (SA)
Special Emergency Response Team (SERT)
United Way (UW)
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD)
The second phase of sampling expanded the amount of useful information included for

each entry. Newly acquired and existing entries were coded with a field titled Class during
sampling based on roles or responsibilities for emergency management and/or supporting
organizations. This step aided in the standardization of the study sample, providing response
options for the survey instrument. Classification categories include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Charitable Organizations (CHRTY)
Government-Related Agency or Office (GOV)
First Responder (1R)
For-Profit Non-Government (FP)
News Media Organization (NP)
Non-Profit Non-Government Organization (NGO)
Next, a coding field was added indicating geographic reach or jurisdiction. The field

Range sorts organizations into three levels of organization including national, state, and county.
Organizations were also coded with a field titled Tag (Table AH2) to increase the precision of
classification. The additional levels of coding were necessary to reflect the separation of roles
and responsibilities. For example, first responders are responsible for rapid deployment for the
protection of human health. We expect first responders will communicate during similar stages
of the four-phase emergency management model, though the literature shows types of first
responders (fire and police) published differing content on differing social media platforms
during Hurricane Sandy (Hughes et al. 2014). The high-detailed taxonomy provided by the
pairing of coding fields Range and Tag allows the classification of roles and responsibilities
defined the DHS National Response Framework, NIMS, and NECP.
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Table AH2: Tags Applied to Twitter Accounts

Although some organizations and agencies maintain policies restricting staff from
following and/or replying to individuals on social media (Beneito-Montagut et al. 2013), the
literature demonstrates the effect of network structure for enhancing situational awareness, interagency communication, and message reach (Wukich and Khemka 2017, DHS 2012b, Wukich
and Steinberg 2013, Sutton et al. 2012, Wukich and Mergel 2015). Network statistics collected
from Twitter accounts including tweets published, followers, following, likes, list, and moments.
These attributes provide an indication of audience size, engagement, and capacity for bidirectional communication. Table AH3 lists and defines all fields collected and developed to
classify and study social media use of the study population.
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Table AH3: Population Sampling Data Collection Fields

The method of classifying Twitter grew in complexity as the sampling continued. Figure
AH1 maps organizational taxonomy, illustrating group membership per classification levels,
Binary, Class, and Tag.
Sampling and coding concluded in December 2017. The additional efforts of direct
searches resulted in identification of 947 relevant Twitter accounts, achieving 96% and 54%
geographic saturation in the Sandy and Isaac study areas respectively, or an overall increase in
geographic saturation of 24%. The inability to retrieve relevant Twitter account using the
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sampling method was greatest in Mississippi, where 59% or 28 of the 49 counties in the study
area not represented in the study population. Complete (100%) geographic saturation was
achieved in the Isaac study area for Florida, and in Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island in the Sandy study area.

Figure AH1: Study Population Taxonomy
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Appendix H. Coded Qualitative Responses Regarding “Other” Obstacles
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Appendix I. Institutional Review Board Documents
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